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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays in Economics of Education and Economic
History.
The first essay “Disentangling the E↵ects of Education on Health: A Sibling-pair
Analysis” examines the causal e↵ect of education on long-run physical health, us-
ing survey data on matched siblings. By adopting a sibling-di↵erences strategy, we
are able to obtain estimates that are not biased by unobserved genetic factors and
family background which a↵ect both education and health. To address the poten-
tial endogenous shocks that a↵ect siblings di↵erently within the family, we further
employ an instrumental variable approach by exploiting a profound disturbance in
the education system during the Cultural Revolution in China. In the first stage, we
investigate the impact of cohort exposure to the disruption on individual completed
years of education. The within-sibling estimates in the second stage suggest that an
additional school year is found to be positively related to health status later in life
(measured by better self-reported health, lower probability of feeling uncomfortable,
getting chronic diseases, and being underweight or overweight). We also unravel the
potential mechanisms by examining the potential roles of income and cognition in
e↵ects of education on health. Controlling for factors that vary within sibling pairs
does not alter the conclusion of this paper.
The second chapter “Good Bye Chiang Kai-shek? The Long-Lasting E↵ects of
Education under the Authoritarian Regime in Taiwan” analyzes whether experi-
encing an authoritarian regime at an early age have long-lasting e↵ects on people’s
political outcomes, such as political attitudes, voting behavior, and national identity?
This paper aims to explore this causality by employing an example from Taiwan. Af-
ter the former leader Chiang Ching-kuo lifted martial law in 1987, Taiwan ended the
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authoritarian regime and began democratization. During that period, the Ministry
of Education removed the major part of ideological content in the textbooks and
required primary and secondary school to change the extra-curriculum activities and
teaching practices, in order to correspond to the needs of the society. Exploiting
this historical event, we utilize cut-o↵ birth dates for school enrollment that lead to
variation in the length of exposure to the authoritarian education system from 1979
to 1987 within the same birth cohort. Based on around 2,800 observations from the
Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS), we find that one additional year of exposure
to authoritarian education during youth reduces subsequent satisfaction with democ-
racy and political participation, increases the likelihood to support and vote for the
KMT party, and drops the probability of self-declared Taiwanese identity rather than
Chinese in later life. Our results persist after ruling out alternative interpretations
and are robust to the sensitivity tests and di↵erent groups definitions.
The third chapter “Quantity-Quality Trade-o↵ in Northeast China during the
Qing Dynasty” paints a detailed picture of how, in the absence of an industrializa-
tion process, the regional popularization of education shaped the trade-o↵ between
human capital and fertility decisions in Northeast China during the Qing Dynasty.
Using data from the China Multi-Generational Panel Dataset-Liaoning (CMGPD-
LN), we investigate 19,490 adult males born between 1760 and 1880 and originating
from nearly 700 di↵erent villages. After clearing out the birth-order e↵ects and
controlling for a rich set of individual, parental, household-level, and village-level
characteristics, we apply both logit and linear probability model as well as an in-
strumental variable approach to test our hypothesis and address endogeneity issues.
Our findings suggest that sibship size, as instrumented by twins at last birth, has a
substantial negative e↵ect on the probability of receiving an education, indicating the
emergence of a child quantity-quality trade-o↵ for large parts of China’s population
in the northeastern region since the mid-18th century. We draw attention to new
evidence showing that the child quantity-quality trade-o↵ is not necessarily a conse-
quence of industrialization, but rather a result of rational behaviors perpetuated by
households in response to high educational returns and accessibility. Such findings
provide a new explanation for birth controls, contributing to a better understanding
of fertility transition in ancient China.
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Chapter 1
Disentangling the E↵ects of




An ageing population presents a phenomenal challenge in China, just as it does
in the rest of the world (Lee and Mason, 2011; Huang and Zhou, 2013). Dramatic
demographic changes have brought renewed focus to the physical and mental health
of the elderlies. Being the most visible of the various dimensions of health, physical
health including strength, flexibility, endurance, nutrient intake, and other aspects,
is understood to be the accumulation of influence from life experiences. A very
general point of view links physical status among the elderly with their educational
achievement at early ages. Since education has been discussed as playing a critical
role in accumulating knowledge, forming lifestyle and habits (Lleras-Muney, 2005;
Clark and Royer, 2013), scholars assume that education generates persistent impacts,
in addition to its contemporary ones.
⇤This study has been published in the B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2018: 18(4).
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In this paper, the causal e↵ect of education on long-term health is disentangled
in a novel way. We base our estimates on a sample of siblings from the China
Family Panel Studies (CFPS). Generally, siblings share similar genetic factors and,
to a large extent, common family background. Associating within-sibling gaps in
education with within-sibling di↵erences in health status, we are therefore able to
di↵erence out impacts from unobserved genetic endowments and common family
characteristics that may bias the education coe cient.
Previous literature utilizes a variety of natural experiments to estimate the causal
e↵ect of schooling on health, such as educational reforms (Lleras-Muney, 2005; Ore-
opoulos, 2006). These studies have, without any doubt, enhanced our understanding
about the causal relationship between education and health. However, natural exper-
iments that these studies rely on, a↵ect those whose return to schooling is di↵erent
from the average returns in the entire population (Cutler and Lleras-Muney, 2008).
For example, compulsory schooling laws are proposed to raise the years at school of
those at the lower tail of the educational distribution of the population, while having
a little influence on those who plan to continue studies anyway. Hence, the estimates
imply simply a local average treatment e↵ect (LATE), but not the e↵ect of increasing
the schooling years for the whole population. In response to these limitations, schol-
ars have come up with a twin-di↵erencing strategy (Lundborg, 2013). Twin design
depends on the occurrence of di↵erences in education within twins. If such di↵er-
ences are equally distributed across twins, the estimates obtained could be closer
to an average treatment e↵ect (ATE) instead. Hence the twin-di↵erences strategy
has great potential to provide important findings in term of the health returns from
schooling in the population.
Unfortunately, the only public and nationwide dataset enabled to match twins
across China is the 1% mini population census. However, the 1% mini population
census does not involve individual health status.2 Due to data limitations, we match
siblings instead of twins using data from the CFPS survey. However, similar to twin
data, the criticism remains that there may be within-pair di↵erences in unobserved
elements that a↵ect education. One major candidate for such within-pair di↵erences,
2The dataset used in Behrman et al. (2015) is not an open-sourced data and it contains only
individuals from Chengdu, Chongqing, Harbin, Hefei and Wuhan, but not a nationwide sample.
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as Bound and Solon (1999) address, is individual weight at birth, given that the
anecdotal evidence indicates that low birth weight may be correlated with personal
ability and health in childhood. Besides this factor, Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998)
suggest that parental treatment to children may be another contributor to the within-
pair di↵erences.
To address the potential within-sibling endogeneity, we control for individual het-
erogeneity and employ an instrumental variable approach. We exploit a profound
shock that happened in China in the 1960s and 1970s, during the Cultural Revo-
lution. After 1966, the standard public education system was massively destroyed
and abandoned due to Chairman Mao’s distrust toward intellectuals. This disrupted
education system caused by social and political upheavals damaged individuals’ hu-
man capital accumulation, measured by quantity and quality of education, and se-
quentially the outcomes including labor market performance in later life (Meng and
Gregory, 2002; Giles et al., 2015). This paper utilizes two-stage least squares (2SLS)
exploring cohort exposure to the interrupted education system during 1966-1972 as
an instrumental variable to investigate the causal e↵ects of education on health. In
the first stage, we find that larger exposure to this disruption leads to fewer years
of schooling achieved. This contributes to the literature by providing an exogenous
source of di↵erences in schooling within siblings.
In the second stage, we employ five variables that link to individuals physical
health conditions in the middle ages, which are: self-reported health, physical dis-
comfort, chronic diseases, underweight, and overweight. After applying 2SLS, the
sibling-fixed e↵ects estimates show that an extra year of education results in bet-
ter health conditions, measured by better self-reported health, lower probability of
feeling uncomfortable, getting chronic diseases, and being underweight. Controlling
for specific factors which di↵er within siblings, such as weight at birth and early life
health, does not alter the conclusion.
In the last part, this paper unravels potential mechanisms by which these out-
comes occur by examining the potential roles of income and cognition in the e↵ects
of education on health. The estimates suggest that all these two mediators explain
well the impact of education achievement on individual health.3
3Especially for self-rated health and probability of chronic conditions, the mediate power of the
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 briefly introduces the
literature and discusses some recent findings. Section 1.3 introduces the empirical
model. After that, we discuss the data used in the analysis from the China Family
Panel Studies (CFPS) in section 1.4. Section 1.5 reports the empirical results and
section 1.6 includes robustness checks. Mechanism analysis is presented in section
1.7. Section 1.8 concludes the paper.
1.2 Literature Reviews
The first strand of relevant literature maps the education-health linkage.
The e↵ect of education on health may be both intuitive and deliberative. First,
schooling and health may be correlated through unobservable genes and family back-
ground. An example is from Fuchs (1982), who proposes time preferences as a can-
didate of “unobserved” factors. It argues that more future-oriented people spend
more on both education and health, both as long-run investments, than less patient
people. Second, health may a↵ect educational attainment. Illness in childhood may
interfere with the studying process and education-related choices and may surely be
related to late-life health (Behrman and Rosenzweig, 2004; Black et al., 2007). The
omission of these factors in a regression biases the coe cient of interests.
To deal with these issues, early literature considers the instrumental variable
approach, by instrumenting children’s education with variables such as parental edu-
cational achievement (Sander, 1995; Leigh and Dhir, 1997). Berger and Leigh (1989)
use per capita income and local per capita expenditures on education in the birth-
place, and parental educational achievement as instruments. However, the exogeneity
of this set of instruments may be questioned.
More recent papers utilize “natural experiments” to estimate the causal e↵ect of
schooling on health. Among these “natural experiments,” educational reforms are
the most frequently exploited. However, these studies su↵er from weak instruments;
therefore, most of them find no e↵ect of education. For instance, Lleras-Muney
(2005) does not find any significant e↵ect on health when instrumenting for educa-
above two variables is quite strong.
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tion. Besides educational reforms, Adams (2002) applies the strategy of Angrist and
Kreuger (1991) by adopting birth quarter as the instrument. Their F-values suggest
the existence of weak instruments, and therefore, no significant e↵ect of education on
health is obtained. Moreover, as addressed in the introduction, these studies identify
“local” e↵ects instead of average e↵ects across the entire population.
Other scholars have provided a twin-di↵erences design, which avoids the draw-
backs above and brings novel perspectives to the literature. Twin strategy was first
employed by Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) and developed by Ashenfelter and Rouse
(1998). Subsequent studies have been done by Miller et al. (2005) using Australian
twin data, as well as Ashenfelter and Rouse (1998) applying data collected from the
Twinsburg Festivals; similarly Behrman and Rosenzweig (1999) utilize data from the
Minnesota Twin Registry, and Bonjour et al. (2003) utilize UK twins data. These
papers disentangle the link between education and wage. Lundborg (2013), as the
first paper that adopts twin strategy to examine the health returns to schooling, finds
that higher educational attainment is positively associated with self-evaluated health
and negatively with number of chronic conditions. Behrman et al. (2015) develop
this strategy by using the Chinese Adults Twins Survey, and find that schooling-
health associations are significant for health-related behaviors, but not for health
outcomes. However, these twin studies make strong assumptions that the di↵erences
in schooling within pairs are all exogenous.
In this paper, we combine the “natural experiment” method and sibling-di↵erences
strategy together to overcome the drawbacks of each, aiming at a higher precision
of identification and better representativeness of the results. It has the potential to
avoid the problems described above and may, therefore, bring some new findings.
Second, the paper is also related to the literature about the Cultural Revolution
in China.
Several studies have examined the e↵ects of the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to
1976. Scholars link the Cultural Revolution to outcomes in educational achievement
and subsequent wages. Both Deng and Treiman (1997) and Meng and Gregory
(2002) estimate the e↵ect of the Cultural Revolution on educational achievement. A
comparison of the Cultural Revolution (CR) cohort and non-CR cohort allows them
to find this adverse impact on human capital accumulations. Meng and Gregory
14
(2007) take a step forward and show that given the educational level achieved, the
impact of these missed years of schooling on subsequent earnings is trivial.
This paper, particularly the first stage of the estimation, also supplements the
literature by showing that the Cultural Revolution indeed destroyed the human cap-
ital accumulation and sequentially, weakened the long-lasting health conditions of
the treated cohorts, and this remains true even within sibling pairs.
1.3 Identification Strategy
1.3.1 Sibling Fixed E↵ects Model
In this section, we employ the sibling fixed e↵ects model to address household-
level unobserved factors, including genetic health conditions, and parental charac-
teristics and social class. The identifying assumption is that after controlling for
sibling fixed e↵ects, we link the educational gap of each sibling pair to their later
di↵erence in health status, obtaining within-sibling estimations as mentioned in the
introduction. Family background, social status and occupations of parents, which
linked closely to household-level educational decisions and individual health, could
be considered invariant for sibling pairs.
Given that the outcomes are binary or ordinal, we apply a linear probability
model (LPM) with sibling fixed e↵ects.4 The outcome of the equation describing the
health status can be expressed as:
Hi =  0 +  1Edui +Xi  + uf +  w + ✏i (1)
where the subscripts i and f index the individual i of sibling pair f , respectively.
The sibling fixed e↵ects, denoted uf , address the heterogeneity common to the sib-
lings, including genetic health conditions, parental characteristics and social class.
Edui stands for individual i’s actual years of education;  1 interprets that for a dif-
ference of an additional year of schooling, how the sibling’s relative health outcome
4We run linear regressions to ease the interpretation of the coe cients after considering potential
heteroscedasticity problem, but results are robust to running Probit or ordered-Probit specifications.
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changes. Xi is a vector of control variables, including age, age squared, gender, ur-
ban dummy (current and at 12-years-old), marital status, ethnicity, a dummy that
indicates whether individual i lives with his/her siblings,  w put a set of dummies, in-
cluding survey year w when i is interviewed, which approximate potential systematic
di↵erence existing across the survey waves. ✏i is the idiosyncratic term.
After applying for sibling fixed e↵ects, several criticisms need to be noted here:
this design does not control for any endogenous factors that a↵ect siblings di↵erently
within the household, which would be concerned if there are di↵erences between the
siblings that a↵ect parents’ decisions on each child’s years of education. Hence we
firstly control for observable personal characteristics, for instance, the individual’s
birth weight and health status in childhood, or whether one smokes or drinks from an
early age for further checks. Then in the next subsection, we employ the instrumental
variable approach to solve the unobservable ones.
Another criticism is that measurement error bias still exists. To counter mea-
surement error, however, we incorporate data from three survey waves. The baseline
survey asked respondents “The enrollment time and completion time for each edu-
cation stage, and how long they spent at each stage.” In the following two surveys,
interviewers were repeatedly asked the same questions about the respondents’ edu-
cation information. If the responses were inconsistent, the interviewer would remind
respondents to reconsider the answer carefully. From the dataset and survey re-
port, we know that the inconsistency rate is lower than 3 percent, which means that
measurement error is not a serious problem in this paper. Repeatedly asking the
same questions in di↵erent surveys might not eliminate measurement error, but to a
certain extent, it reduces the occurrence of such a situation.
1.3.2 Instrumental Variable Approach
To solve the potential endogeneity originating from the endogenous sibling-di↵erences
mentioned above, we exploit the most profound event in 1960s-1970s China, the
Cultural Revolution. Particularly, we focus on education system disruption, an im-
portant part of the Cultural Revolution, which a↵ected exogenously and di↵erently
on siblings born in di↵erent years. An advantage compared to twin strategy shows
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up here that sibling pair design allows observations of individuals born in di↵erent
years, who were thus exposed to di↵erent extents to the exogenous event, as the next
section illustrates.
Background: School Interruption during the Cultural Revolution In May
1966, Chairman Mao launched the Cultural Revolution in order to stave o↵ capitalist-
roaders and reassert his control over the Communist party. With his distrusted to-
wards intellectuals, Mao held the view that the intellectuals were not real believers
in socialism and communism, and should be punished and revolutionarily reborn
through constant criticism and self-criticism. The idea at that time shook the status
of educated people dramatically, while the standard public education system that
cultivated intellectuals was massively abandoned and disrupted in China for the en-
tire six years from 1966 to 1972 (MacFarquhar, 1997; MacFarquhar and Schoenhals,
2006).
Since 1966, national education was severely a↵ected by two aspects of the Cul-
tural Revolution. The first is characterized by the closure of schools and therefore
a shorter schooling period. The universities were shut down for a decade, elemen-
tary and high schools were closed for two years and subsequently reopened with
a low-quality expansion. Even when schools were reopened during 1968 and 1972,
the public schooling became shorter, shrinking from 6-3-3 primary-junior-senior high
school years to 5-2-2. The second aspect involves curriculum changes after the re-
opening of the schools. Neither primary nor secondary schools followed the standard
school curriculum from before the Cultural Revolution, instead emphasizing leader
worship, political ideology, and peasant and worker techniques.5 The students also
were required to participate intensively in the revolution and were organized as Red
Guards.
To sum up, between 1966 and 1972, the disrupted public education system re-
5From historical documentation, we can see how the curriculum changed: before 1966, pupils
learned basic Math and Chinese, while between 1966 and 1972, for students after Grade 3, Chinese
lessons were replaced by the study of the poems of Chairman Mao and articles about class conflicts,
and pupils were required to take a new course named “Quotations from Chairman Mao.” Middle
school students were required to take the new course “Quotations from Chairman Mao” as well,
while contents of other courses reduced sharply.
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duced the schooling period of the cohorts a↵ected. On the one hand, individuals
needed fewer years at school to obtain a diploma, and on the other hand, both closure
of schools and universities, and ideological infiltration in the curriculum discouraged
the treated cohorts to continue their studies. The quality of education experienced a
sharp reduction conditioned on years of schooling since students learned less knowl-
edge at school compared to students before or after that period; instead, most of their
time involved production practices in factories or farms and political activities. The
abnormal schooling system during the Cultural Revolution has been demonstrated
by Cai and Du (2003) and Meng and Gregory (2007), which suggest that as a result
of the disruption, both education quantity and quality was largely a↵ected during
the revolutionary years. We focus particularly on the reduced schooling years and
the corresponding outcomes in the following parts.
Instrument: Cohort Exposure to Disrupted Education We exploit the expo-
sure to the disrupted education of enrollment cohort to which the individual belongs,
as an instrumental variable.6 To capture the cohort variation in exposure, we check
the distribution of the schooling cohorts during disruption years (1966-1972). In
CFPS, rich information on individual enrollment time and duration for certain levels
of education is provided. Following Wu (2017), we calculate the proportion of people
at school during 1966-1972 by enrollment cohorts, denoted CohortExposurej, where
the subscript j represents the enrollment cohort that individual i belongs to. The
larger the proportion is, the larger ratio of people whose education has been disrupted
in the movement, to the larger extent a specific cohort was exposed to schooling inter-
ruption. Figure 1.1 shows the distribution, whereby the schooling cohorts, who were
born in the 1950 and 1960s, are quite likely to be at school during the period 1966-
1972, and inevitably, are the ones whose education has been interrupted. Hence,
we take individuals who were born between September 1949 and September 1967
(and therefore more intensively involved in the disruption) as IE cohorts. Within IE
cohorts, the di↵erent exposure ratios shown by the black line allow the comparison
6To define enrollment cohorts, we follow the literature by assuming individuals who were born
after September would enroll one year later compared with individuals born in the same year but
before September. With 1 September the cut-o↵ date for school entry, we thus define the enrollment
cohorts.
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of siblings that were both a↵ected, but to a di↵erent extent. Meanwhile, the non-IE
cohorts, including the pre-IE cohorts (those born before September 1947) and the
post-IE cohorts (those born after September 1966), were almost una↵ected by this
educational channel. We exploit a cuto↵ of cohort exposure equal to 10 percent in
defining IE-cohorts and not-IE cohorts. Table 1.1 transmits the same messages, and
documents the detailed proportions of being at school by enrollment cohort and indi-
cates clearly whether an enrollment cohort belongs to the IE-cohorts or not. An issue
to be addressed here is that all of these 32 cohorts listed in Table 1.1 were exposed
to the Cultural Revolution, and the direct impact from the political movement and
social chaos other than education disruption can be considered the same for all these
cohorts conditional on birth cohort fixed e↵ects.
Two-Stage Least Squares We then conduct 2SLS estimation. The first-stage
model is illustrated as follows:
Edui =  CohortExposurej +  Xi + uf +  bw + ✏i (2)
Where the subscript j represents the enrollment cohort where individual i be-
longs. In this stage, we utilize this CohortExposurej to instrument years of educa-
tion. Besides all the covariates in equation (1), birth cohort fixed e↵ects are further
included to control for any birth cohort7 trend and heterogeneity from the social
unrests during the Cultural Revolution apart from the educational disturbance.
The estimate of   is expected to be negative.8 This expectation on first-stage
results is supported by Meng and Gregory (2002, 2007) and Giles et al. (2008),
which investigate the negative impact of this interrupted education system during
the revolution on individual educational attainment, measured by years in school.
7We employ a three-year window to the years of birth from 1943 to 1976.
8Two underlying mechanisms explain the first-stage association: higher proportion of exposure
of a given enrollment cohort, lower school years achieved of its belonging individuals. One is that
the individual i, as the part of cohort j’s proportion attending school when the disruption occurred,
was those whose education has been directly suspended and shortened. The other mechanism is the
spillover e↵ects. For the individual i who had left school before 1966, the estimated impact would
be only caused by the externalities or education of others enrolled in the same year. In section
1.6.2, we report that the second mechanism is not the main driver of the first-stage results.
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Figure 1.2 shows that the expected findings may also be supported by our dataset by
reporting the actual years of education by three educational levels, primary school,
junior high school and senior high school, respectively. For primary school achieve-
ment, the a↵ected cohorts have fewer years of schooling than their younger and older
cohorts. The pattern is similar for junior high and senior high school students that
the IE cohorts have relatively fewer years of schooling on average. These di↵erences
are attributed to the closure of schools and the shorter public educational system
faced by the IE cohorts.
Finally, we then conduct 2SLS to estimate the e↵ects of education on health:
Hi =  0 +  1[Edui +  Xi + uf +  bw + ✏i (3)
[Edui is the predicted education value of equation (2) and all the other variables
are the same as those in equation (2). The sibling fixed e↵ects appear in both stage,
denoted uf , therefore  1 is again interpreted as a sibling-di↵erences estimate.
1.4 Data and Variables
1.4.1 Dataset
We utilize the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS), a nationally representative,
longitudinal survey of Chinese families and individuals launched by the Institute of
Social Science Survey (ISSS) of Peking University, China.
The CFPS consists of four questionnaires (Community, Family, Adolescent, and
Adult), with economic information, as well as information on the wellbeing of the
Chinese population. It contains abundant information on demographic and socioe-
conomic characteristics, such as gender, date of birth, registered residency (hukou in
Chinese9), type of residency (rural or urban), ethnicity, marital status, educational
attainment, employment status, etc., and covers research topics such as education
outcomes, economic activities, family dynamics and relationships, and health. In
the 2010 baseline survey, the CFPS successfully surveyed nearly 15,000 households
9Hukou is a system of household registration in China.
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and approximately 42,590 individuals within those households. In 2012 and 2014,
the CFPS carried out two full-scale follow-up surveys on tracked samples of 2010
reservations and further included abundant new samples. The 2012 and 2014 ques-
tionnaires shared similar structures to those in 2010. We employ responses from
2010, and from new participants in 2012, and 2014 as well, creating a pooled cross-
sectional dataset, in order to obtain within-birth cohort variations in treatment and
age.
The unique parental ID in the cross-sectional dataset allows us to match the
siblings. Out of the 35,889 individuals interviewed, around 550 individuals of 180
households were chosen for our sibling sample.
1.4.2 Physical Health Outcomes
The CFPS requires interviewees to answer multiple questions about their physical
and mental health. Among those, five questions are directly linked to the respon-
dent’s physical health conditions, which we use as outcome variables.
Self-reported health is an ordinal variable created by the responses to the question:
“How would you describe your health in the last six months?” Individuals are required
to evaluate their recent health status from 1 to 5: 1 for excellent, 2 very good, 3
good, 4 fair and, 5 poor. We employ Self-reported health as our first variable, which is
the standard practice in the health economics literature. Although it is a subjective
outcome variable, normally individuals are more aware of their own health than
anyone else is. In the sibship sample, 13.5 percent of respondents reported poor
health, while nearly 20 percent report fair health.
We collected responses to the question “During the past two weeks, have you felt
physically uncomfortable?” which is denoted as physical discomfort, with value zero
for “no” and one for “yes.” It is still a subjective variable but is vital: discomfort may
be considered a subtle sign to warn people of health problems. Around 29 percent
of the sibling sample have felt uncomfortable in the survey.
The third measure is the chronic disease, which captures doctor-diagnosed disease
or injury. chronic disease equals one if the respondent has been diagnosed by the
doctor with a chronic disease, and zero otherwise. This could be regarded as an
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important objective health variable: whether the doctor confirmed the respondent
has a chronic disease. 14 percent of the sample was diagnosed with a chronic disease.
The last two are denoted as underweight and obesity, indicating whether an in-
dividual is underweight (BMI19) or overweight (BMI 28), which have been widely
used in the literature in describing the subjects’ nutrition (Huang, 2017). BMI is
a value derived from the weight and height of an individual, and since the dataset
o↵ers us this information, we calculate the index by the formula. The reported
underweight rate is 9 percent, while the obesity rate is 23 percent.
Descriptive Statistics Column (1) of Table 1.2 summarizes descriptive statistics
for the health outcome variables above, years of schooling, cohort exposure to the
educational disruption and the covariates of the whole sibling sample. It shows
that the total number of siblings is 550, and overall, the sample had 7.46 years of
schooling. For the covariates, 85 percent of the respondents are male. This large
percent is driven by the fact that for the CFPS, sibling pairs appear mainly in
households with all or some of the siblings living together, with a share of 90 percent
so all siblings could be surveyed. And in rural China, it is more common that male
siblings lived together, while female siblings left when they got married. Hence the
matched siblings pair are mainly male siblings.10 The average age in the sample is
44. 8 percent are ethnic minorities, 35 percent are urban residents, 10 percent lived
in urban areas during the Cultural Revolution. Around 9 percent were retired, while
nearly 78 percent had gotten married.
The descriptive statistics by cohort are reported in columns (2) and (3). Around
35 percent of respondents belong to the IE cohorts.11 Comparing to the older and
younger cohorts, IE cohorts were 33 percent more likely to be at school during the
Cultural Revolution, and that is how we distinguish IE groups from the non-IE
ones. The raw p-values testing for the statistical significance of the di↵erences in
characteristics of an interviewee in IE and non-IE groups, are presented in column
(4). The health status of the siblings whose education was interrupted is significantly
10However, this limitation does not threaten our analysis, since this pattern shows up in both
IE-cohorts and non-IE cohorts.
11Their projected birth dates are defined in Table 1.1.
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worse, i.e. a lower state of self-reported health, a higher probability of feeling physical
discomfort, getting a chronic disease, or being underweight. Moreover, siblings that
belong to IE cohorts are relatively less educated, measured by around one fewer year
of schooling. Units in the IE and non-IE groups are balanced on almost all other




In Table 1.3, we adopt an LPM model as a model specification with the sibship
sample and examine the e↵ect of schooling on health profile.12 Odd columns report
raw correlations between schooling and health condition. In even columns, we in-
clude sibling fixed e↵ects that allow within-sibling estimations. The raw correlations
suggest that higher level of education is negatively and significantly associated with
bad health status, measured by poorer self-rated health, higher odds of discomfort,
getting chronic diseases, and being underweight as well, except for obesity. The
results conditional on the sibling fixed e↵ects show consistent findings. Education
decreases the self-reported indicator by 2.5 percentage points in column (2). An
additional year in school corresponds to a 1.4 percentage points decrease in the like-
lihood of discomfort as shown in column (4) and a 0.7 percentage points reduction in
being diagnosed with a chronic disease as column (6). Columns (8) and (10) capture
the significant e↵ect of school-age education on abnormal BMI, with a conditional
correlation of -0.013 and -0.009.
In Table 1.4, we conduct the sibling fixed e↵ects model as a model specifica-
tion with the sibship sample, controlling for age, age squared, gender, ethnicity,
12Choosing siblings out of the full sample does potentially generate selection issues. We therefore
experiment with traditional Heckman selection models, using household size in the selection equa-
tion. With a larger household size, there is a higher probability of an individual living with parents
and siblings and, therefore, they are more likely to be interviewed and recorded together. However,
we found no evidence that selection a↵ects our estimates from the insignificant inverse Mills ratios
shown in Appendix Table A.1.
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urban dummy (both current and at 12 years old), marital status, retirement dummy,
and whether the individual lives with his/her siblings and wave fixed e↵ects in odd
columns. We further include province fixed e↵ects in even columns. The conditional
results estimated by the sibling fixed e↵ects model show the same pattern as Table
1.3 and stay robust no matter if our set of covariates is included or not: one extra
year of education is associated with a reduced probability of poor health conditions.
The signs of the covariates are what we expected: females and married couples are
healthier than males and singles, respectively. Individuals who are retired have bet-
ter self-reported health and less likelihood to be underweight, conditional on age
and age squared. If individuals obtained the urban hukou, the likelihood of being
underweight drops while the probability of chronic disease increases. The limitation
of data prevents us from exploring the reasons. One probable reason may be China’s
serious urban pollution, which leads to chronic respiratory diseases.
Appendix Table A.2 further divide the sibship sample by type of residency and
gender to study the heterogeneous within-sibling e↵ects of the education on health.
The place of residence has long been considered as a key health determinant, which
is particularly the case in China, where disparities among urban and rural popula-
tions are tremendous due to legal designations implemented by hukou system and
the di↵erentiated economic, health, and other social policies applied to these two
departments. Consistent with the policy implications, the results indicate that the
e↵ect of education is greater for sibling pairs with rural hukou. For sibling pairs with
urban hukou in their schooling ages, the e↵ect is statistically insignificant from zero
for most of the outcome variables. The di↵erence may be attributed to alternative
channels to access knowledge in developed urban areas. This accessibility can reduce
the gap in school between the urban siblings.
Heterogeneity between the Siblings The crucial assumption made in the liter-
ature is that schooling di↵erences within siblings are exogenous, conditional on the
sibling fixed e↵ects and included covariates. There is perhaps no way of proving that
di↵erences in schooling within siblings are exogenous. It could shed some light on the
issue if abundant information on early life di↵erences between siblings is available.
Since the CFPS has such information on early life factors, we would like to address
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these problems. In this part, we control for individual weight at birth, which is a
continuous variable, and poor health status in early age, which is assigned one if
the respondents claimed that the reason they could not graduate/pursue studying
is a health problem, and zero otherwise.13 Heterogeneity in young-age habits is also
considered, such as information about drinking and smoking from an early age.
After controlling for heterogeneity across siblings, the robustness of the e↵ect
remains, as shown in Table 1.5. It is not surprising that early life health status is
positively correlated with health in later life, while an individual’s weight at birth
does not play a role, conditional on household health-related genetic factors. How-
ever, these cannot control for unobservable heterogeneity within the family, which
may a↵ect the parents’ decisions on a child’s years of schooling, and subsequent
health conditions in old age before implementing 2SLS.
1.5.2 Instrumented Results
The first-stage results are available in Table 1.6. In all columns, we control for
birth cohort fixed e↵ects and sibling fixed e↵ects, and set of covariates. The esti-
mates remain negative and statistically significant, indicating an adverse impact of
exposure to educational disruption on the actual years of schooling of the individuals
from the schooling cohorts. The F-statistics in the first stage and Hansen tests for
the instrumental variable are reported at the bottom of Table 1.6. The F-values
provide evidence of a significant first stage no matter if the covariates are included
or not, suggesting the instrument is by no means a weak instrument. Moreover, the
instrument also passes the Hansen tests (over-identification tests). The excludability
of the instrument cannot be tested directly, but indirect evidence can be o↵ered in
support of such an assumption. Hence in Table A.3 of Appendix, we regress the vari-
ables that correlate with health outcomes on the instrument. In these regressions,
our instrument is statistically insignificant in any regression, the validity of which is
further confirmed.
In Table 1.7, we report the second-stage results by regressing health outcomes
13In addition to these, there are other ways to do sensitivity analysis, such as excluding sibling
pairs that faced very di↵erent early life health conditions from the analyses or controlling for parental
time investments and attitudes towards each of their children.
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on instrumented years of schooling. For self-evaluated health conditions, the sibling-
di↵erences 2SLS estimates in columns (1) reveal that an additional year of education
reduces the indicator by 0.06 (4 percent of the mean). Columns (2) suggest the e↵ect
of education on the odds of reporting feeling uncomfortable is 5 percentage points (17
percent of the mean). From columns (3), we know the sibling-di↵erencing e↵ect on
chronic disease is -0.035. Column (4) show that an additional one year of schooling
results in a drop of 2 percentage points in the underweight rate (around 17 percent
of the mean), suggesting that schooling can strongly improve nutritional status.
The sibling-di↵erences e↵ects on obesity are around -0.020, which is statistically
insignificant though. These within-sibling results suggest that the a↵ected cohorts
have been placed in disadvantaged positions in term of health as a result of various
interruptions in human capital accumulation in their youths.
Some Confounding Factors A source of heterogeneity comes from a confounder
along with the instrument, the send-down policy. During the Cultural Revolution,
Chairman Mao also initiated the forced rustication movement by sending millions of
urban middle school students (10-19 years) to the countryside, which is called the
“up to the mountains and down to the countryside” (or “send-down”) movement.
The scheme applied to all eligible urban individuals who would graduate from high
school, exactly those who were exposed to the closure of schools. The eligible urban
youths were therefore exiled to the countryside with extremely heavy farm work
instead of being educated during their school-age years, even after the reopening
of schools. Being estranged from their family for several years, they experienced
a dramatic decline in the standard of living, and consequentially they were more
likely to develop health problems later in life, as discussed by Xie et al. (2007),
Li and Walder (2010), Liang and Li (2014) and Gong et al. (2014). Hence, this
variable should be explicitly controlled for. Based on the sent-down information
from the CFPS dataset, we would like to put send-down in the model to conduct the
following exercise.
In this part, we again control for individuals’ early-age characteristics to solve het-
erogeneity within-siblings: birth weight and early life health. The results conditional
on these individual heterogeneities are shown in columns of Table 1.8, which summa-
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rize the regression results on health outcomes conditional on early life characteristics
and send down experience. This lends additional credibility to our estimation and
to the validity of applying an instrumental approach to examine the health returns
to schooling. The estimated parameters of our variable of interests remain negative
and significant.
1.6 Robustness Checks
1.6.1 Confounding Historical Factors
Now we focus on a confounding factor which might threaten our identification
strategy, the Great Famine, which was a period in China between 1959 and 1961
characterized by serious famine.14 Both harsh weather and the incorrect policies
of the Chinese Communist Party contributed to this widespread famine. The event
may also have had persistent adverse consequences on children who were born during
the famine and therefore exposed to malnutrition and other harmful environments
during their fetal period (Hertzman and Wiens, 1996; Hertzman and Power, 2003;
Chen and Zhou, 2007). Since part of our sample was born around the Great Famine,
it is necessary to control for the potential consequences of the famine on health in
later life (Almond et al., 2010). In Table 1.9 we consider age 0-3 for the shock to
the initial nutrition endowment due to famine by creating a dummy for famine and
assigning a value of one to an individual who was born between 1956 and 1961.
Results of models controlling for the Great Famine are reported in Table 1.9. The
e↵ects of schooling on later-life health remain robust regardless of considering or not
the e↵ect of the famine. Table 1.9 also reports the significant e↵ect of the Great
Famine on self-reported health and the likelihood of physical discomfort, conditional
on sibling fixed e↵ects.
14According to government statistics and historical documentation, there were about 15 million
excess deaths during this period.
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1.6.2 Placebo Test
A placebo test is conducted to check in the first stage, whether the disrupted na-
tional education system a↵ects the quantity of education of some individuals when
it should not. Specifically, we select those who were born as schooling cohorts as
defined in Table 1.1, but stopped attending school before 1966 and consider these
people as “fake” schooling cohorts, because their education was not in fact inter-
rupted by the Cultural Revolution. In this part, we compare siblings belonging to
“fake” IE cohort with siblings born before September 1949 (pre-IE cohorts) or after
September 1967 (post-IE cohorts). Since “fake” schooling cohorts were not targeted
by the education disruption, we expect no statistically significant e↵ect of the instru-
ment on education in the first-stage, hence no e↵ect on health outcomes. In other
words, if there are any significant e↵ects on those outcomes, then one would suspect
that the instrument CohortExposure may have captured something else out of the
educational channel. The reduced-form results are shown in Table 1.10. No signif-
icant e↵ects of the CohortExposure could be found on the outcomes of the “fake”
IE cohort.
1.7 Mechanisms
We follow the methodology in Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010) and Huang (2017)
to quantify the possible channels by including proxies of potential mediators (i.e.,
income and cognition) into the equation:






[Edui +  0Xi +Medi + uf +  bw + ✏i (5)
The outcome variable Hi denotes the five health outcomes mentioned above. We
use instrumented education directly because it helps us to get unbiased results. All
the other settings are the same as those in equation (3). Medi proxies the potential
mediators (i.e., income and cognition). Following the literature, we exploit the change
in the magnitude of the coe cient on instrumented education as the part explained
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by Medi. The explained proportion equals 1  | 01/ 1|, the larger this proportion is,
the larger the mediate power.
Income In Panel A of Table 1.11, an additional year of schooling increases monthly
wage by 4.3 percentage points, close to the findings in the previous literature (Angrist
and Kreuger, 1991). It further confirms the validity of our instrument and 2SLS.
Unsurprisingly, higher education predicts higher income, suggesting people with a
better educational level can live a higher quality life, such as buying a house in a
safer region, working in a better environment, experiencing less financial pressure,
etc., and can purchase better health products, preventive medical care, and health
insurance.
Column (1) of Panel B reports the overall e↵ects of the instrumented education.
Column (2) shows the conditional e↵ects when logged income is controlled for and
column (3) shows the results for the proportions explained by the logged income.
The part that can be explained by income reaches its maximum, a 62.59 percent
for self-reported health, and 46.85 percent for chronic disease in the sibship sample.
The mediate power of income is also large for being underweight, 26.91 percent. In
general, income is the main channel through which education a↵ects health.
Cognition The CFPS data o↵ers respondents’ performance in verbal tests and
number series tests, which allows evaluation of individuals’ cognitive skills. As sug-
gested in Panel A, the IE cohorts have lower scores in both verbal tests and number
series test on average given educational level. This reveals that educational quantity
and quality of schooling cohorts were profoundly a↵ected during the Cultural Revo-
lution. Previous literature also suggests a reduction in educational quality by birth
cohort, conditional on one’s educational attainment.
Since it has been well demonstrated that education plays an important role in
generating social capital (Helliwell and Putnam, 2007; Oreopoulos and Salvanes,
2011), it is very likely that the abnormal education system during the Cultural
Revolution damaged health by lowering not only education quantity but also quality.
To test this hypothesis, a straightforward way is to control for both quantity and
quality of schooling at the individual level, with the results presented in columns
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(4) and (5) of Panel B. Column (4) suggests the conditional e↵ects when cognitive
skills, measured by word recall test and math test, are controlled for, and column (5)
shows the corresponding explained proportion. The proportion that can be mediated
by cognition ranges from 6 percent to 26.14 percent, implying that cognition is also
an important channel, particularly for chronic disease and underweight status. The
findings are consistent with the literature that stresses the importance of cognitive
skills (Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008; Aaronson and Mazumder, 2011; Carlsson et
al., 2012).
Formation of Beliefs and Habits Education can improve individuals’ daily liv-
ing skills, develop their endurance, and therefore well-educated people may have
grown to cherish life and develop healthy habits from an early age. Unfortunately, in
CFPS, questions for health-related beliefs and habits do not always appear. For in-
stance, individual hours of physical exercise appear only in the 2010 and 2014 waves.
Due to data limitations, we leave the questions to future studies that will give us a
better understanding of the mediate power of beliefs and habits.
1.8 Conclusion
This study estimates the e↵ects of the schooling at the young age on long-term
health status from a novel perspective, by linking di↵erent levels of education within
siblings to di↵erent health statuses in their later life. Using sibship samples from the
CFPS, our results show that after controlling for unobservable genetic factors and
family background, less educated siblings su↵er adverse e↵ects regarding physical
health. To solve the heterogeneity issues within sibling-pair studies, we control for
the individuals’ health at birth and at a very early age.
To address the issue of endogeneity, that is if the schooling decision of an indi-
vidual remains endogenous conditional on household characteristics and preferences,
we further employ a 2SLS approach. In the first stage, we exploit the disrupted
national education system during the Cultural Revolution, which exogenously af-
fected the schooling cohorts (IE cohorts). Between 1966 and 1972, the schooling
system became shorter, shrinking from 6-3-3 primary-junior-senior high school years
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to 5-2-2, and the lack of a normal curriculum discouraged schooling cohorts from
continuing their studies, hence the cohorts exposed more to interrupted education
have fewer years of schooling. The proportion of each enrollment cohort attending
school during the Cultural Revolution captures the cohort’s exposure to interrupted
education and negatively explains its belonging individual’s length of education in
the first stage. The predicted years of schooling are put in the regression instead
of the endogenous education level in the second stage, and the sibling-di↵erencing
estimation indicates that an additional year of schooling drops self-reported health
by 0.06, decreases the probability of reporting feeling uncomfortable by 5 percentage
points, and the likelihood of being diagnosed with chronic disease by 2.5 percentage
points. Meanwhile, it reduces by about 4 percentage points in the abnormal weights
rate.
The rest of this paper explores the potential mechanisms underlying these re-
sults. Following the framework in Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2010), we examine the
potential roles of income and cognition in e↵ects of education on health. The esti-
mates suggest that these two factors strongly explain the impact on health. These
results confirm the causal association between schooling and health and suggest that
the 50s-60s cohorts in China have been placed in disadvantaged positions in term of
health as a result of the interruptions in their early human capital accumulation.
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Figure 1.1: Proportion of Being at School during the Educational Disruption
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Figure 1.2: Changes in Actual Years of Schooling
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Table 1.1: Cohort Exposure to Interrupted Education
Dates of Birth
(Enrollment cohort)
Proportion of being at school
(Cohort Exposure to IE)
Corresponding cohorts
Sep,1975- Aug,1976 0.002 post-IE cohort
Sep,1974- Aug,1975 0.002 post-IE cohort
Sep,1973- Aug,1974 0.004 post-IE cohort
Sep,1972- Aug,1973 0.007 post-IE cohort
Sep,1971- Aug,1972 0.009 post-IE cohort
Sep,1970- Aug,1971 0.006 post-IE cohort
Sep,1969- Aug,1970 0.007 post-IE cohort
Sep,1968- Aug,1969 0.006 post-IE cohort
Sep,1967- Aug,1968 0.028 post-IE cohort
Sep,1966- Aug,1967 0.029 post-IE cohort
Sep,1965- Aug,1966 0.311 IE cohort
Sep,1964- Aug,1965 0.450 IE cohort
Sep,1963- Aug,1964 0.543 IE cohort
Sep,1962- Aug,1963 0.556 IE cohort
Sep,1961- Aug,1962 0.594 IE cohort
Sep,1960- Aug,1961 0.629 IE cohort
Sep,1959- Aug,1960 0.610 IE cohort
Sep,1958- Aug,1959 0.536 IE cohort
Sep,1957- Aug,1958 0.486 IE cohort
Sep,1956- Aug,1957 0.483 IE cohort
Sep,1955- Aug,1956 0.446 IE cohort
Sep,1954- Aug,1955 0.423 IE cohort
Sep,1953- Aug,1954 0.330 IE cohort
Sep,1952- Aug,1953 0.257 IE cohort
Sep,1951- Aug,1952 0.236 IE cohort
Sep,1950- Aug,1951 0.164 IE cohort
Sep,1949- Aug,1950 0.107 IE cohort
Sep,1947- Aug,1949 0.100 IE cohort
Sep,1946- Aug,1947 0.044 Pre-IE cohort
Sep,1945- Aug,1946 0.021 Pre-IE cohort
Sep,1944- Aug,1945 0.010 Pre-IE cohort
Sep,1943- Aug,1944 0.011 Pre-IE cohort
1 We employ a cuto↵ of 10 percent to define schooling cohort, and the assignment into treatment
and control groups is similar to Meng and Gregory (2002).
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Table 1.2: Descriptive Statistics : Siblings Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean (S.D.) p-value
All Non-IE cohort IE cohort
Health Variables
Self-reported health 2.947 2.829 3.187 <0.000
(1=excellent,2=very good,3=good,4=fair,5=poor) (1.247) (1.224) (1.261)
Physical Discomfort 0.288 0.256 0.346 0.046
(1=Yes,0=No) (0.458) (0.445) (0.477)
Chronic disease 0.142 0.089 0.239 <0.000
(1=Yes,0=No) (0.355) (0.297) (0.428)
Underweight 0.089 0.068 0.132 0.013
(BMI19,1=Yes,0=No) (0.285) (0.252) (0.339)
Obesity 0.225 0.239 0.198 0.275
(BMI 28,1=Yes,0=No) (0.418) (0.427) (0.399)
Explanatory Variable & Instrumental Variable
Schooling 7.457 7.802 6.735 0.005
(4.452) (4.368) (4.550)
CohortExposure 12.43 1.218 35.09 <0.000
(19.74) (1.234) (20.17)
Control Variables
Age 44.80 41.88 50.71 <0.000
(6.581) (5.113) (5.091)
Male 0.849 0.850 0.846 0.893
(0.358) (0.357) (0.362)
Ethnic Minority 0.080 0.082 0.077 0.852
(0.272) (0.274) (0.267)
Urban 0.347 0.351 0.341 0.819
(0.477) (0.478) (0.475)
Urban (young-age) 0.098 0.101 0.093 0.792
(0.298) (0.301) (0.292)
Married 0.782 0.777 0.791 0.708
(0.413) (0.417) (0.408)
Retired 0.089 0.079 0.110 0.229
(0.285) (0.270) (0.314)
Co-habiting 0.895 0.889 0.907 0.519
(0.307) (0.315) (0.292)
N 550 368 182
1 Non-IE cohort Includes pre-CR cohort (1943.9-1947.9) and post-CR cohort (1966.9-1976.9).
2 Column (4) reports raw (unconditional) p-value for a t-test of di↵erences in means across cohort. Significant raw di↵erence in































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.6: 2SLS: First-stage Results
Schooling
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CohortExposure -0.105*** -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.096**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.046)
Sibling FE Y Y Y Y
Birth-cohort FE Y Y Y Y
Wave FE N Y Y Y
Controls N N Y Y
Province FE N N N Y
N 531 531 531 531
First Stage F-statistics 13.20 13.31 18.47 14.90
P-value for the F-tests 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Over-identification P-values 0.197 0.267 0.313 0.143
1 Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the household level.
Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2 Control variables include age, age square, gender, urban dummy (at 12-year-old), current urban
dummy, marital status, retirement dummy, ethnic minority dummy, whether siblings live together.
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Table 1.7: 2SLS with Sibling Fixed E↵ects
Self-rep. health Phy. discomfort Chronic disease Underweight Obesity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Schooling -0.058** -0.049** -0.026* -0.021** -0.020
(0.026) (0.021) (0.015) (0.009) (0.019)
Sibling FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
N 524 421 421 524 524
1 Coe cients are estimated from linear model. Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered
at the household level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 1.8: 2SLS: Sibling Fixed E↵ects with Additional Controls
Self-rep. health Phy. discomfort Chronic disease Underweight Obesity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Schooling -0.058* -0.051** -0.026* -0.019** -0.019
(0.034) (0.021) (0.015) (0.010) (0.019)
Early-life health 0.104 -0.048 0.097*** 0.088* -0.030
(0.229) (0.092) (0.036) (0.047) (0.071)
Birth weight 0.029 -0.006 0.030* 0.012 -0.011
(0.037) (0.022) (0.016) (0.009) (0.016)
Send-down 0.127 0.233 0.063 -0.088*** -0.250**
(0.116) (0.188) (0.120) (0.028) (0.119)
Sibling FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
N 524 421 421 524 524
1 Coe cients are estimated from linear model. Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the
household level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2 Covariates include age, age square, gender, urban dummy (at 12-year-old), current urban dummy, marital status, retirement dummy,
ethnic minority dummy, whether siblings live together, survey wave fixed e↵ects and birth cohort fixed e↵ects.
3 A source of heterogeneity comes from a confounder along with the instrument, the send-down policy. During the Cultural Revolution,
Chairman Mao also initiated the forced rustication movement by sending millions of urban middle school students (10-19 years) to
the countryside. The scheme applied to all eligible urban individuals who would graduate from high school, exactly those who were
exposed to the closure of schools. Being estranged from their family for several years, they experienced a dramatic decline in the
standard of living, and consequentially, may have di↵erent health outcomes nowadays, as discussed by Xie et al. (2007).
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Table 1.9: Robustness Check: Great Famine
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Self-rep. health Phy. discomfort Chronic disease Underweight Obesity
Schooling -0.070** -0.072*** -0.039** -0.025** -0.029
(0.033) (0.023) (0.019) (0.013) (0.023)
Great famine 0.335*** 0.197* 0.127 0.029 0.145
(0.118) (0.112) (0.110) (0.052) (0.114)
Sibling FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls & Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y
N 534 422 430 534 534
1 Coe cients are estimated from linear model. Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the
household level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2 Control variables include age, age square, gender, urban dummy (at 12-year-old), current urban dummy, marital status, retirement
dummy, ethnic minority dummy, whether siblings live together.
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Table 1.10: Robustness Check: Placebo Test
Reduced form: “Fake” IE cohorts vs. non-IE cohorts
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Schooling Self-rep. health Phy. discomfort Chronic disease Underweight Obesity
CohortExposure 0.168 0.047 0.040 0.031 0.008 0.040
(0.222) (0.087) (0.040) (0.029) (0.021) (0.027)
Sibling FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Birth cohort & Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 357 363 288 297 363 363
1 Placebo sample selected here is consist of “fake” IE cohorts siblings and non-IE cohorts siblings. Coe cients are estimated from linear model. Robust
standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the household level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2 Control variables include age, age square, gender, urban dummy (at 12-year-old), current urban dummy, marital status, retirement dummy, ethnic
minority dummy, whether siblings live together.
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Table 1.11: Mechanism: Intermediate Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
E↵ect of Income Cognition
Schooling Cond. E↵. Explained(%) Cond. E↵. Explained(%)
Panel A
Income 0.043** - - - -
(0.018)
Math test 0.215*** - - - -
(0.033)
Word test 0.149*** - - - -
(0.047)
Panel B
Self-report health -0.058 -0.022 62.59 -0.054 6.156
Physical discomfort -0.051 -0.045 12.43 -0.038 26.14
Chronic disease -0.026 -0.014 46.85 -0.023 10.97
Underweight -0.019 -0.014 26.91 -0.018 6.06
1 Panel A shows the impact of education, instrumented by cohort exposure during the educational disruption, on the
potential intermediate variables: income (measured by logged monthly wage (yuan)), CFPS word test (z-score),
CFPS number series test (z-score).
2 Panel B shows the role of the above intermediate variables in e↵ects of education on health outcomes.
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Table A.1: Heckman selection model
Self-rep. health Phy. discomfort Chronic disease Underweight Obesity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Schooling -0.025** -0.012** -0.008* -0.009*** -0.000
(0.013) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Panel B: First Stage
Sibship Sample
Household size 0.102*** 0.101*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.100***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
mills
lambda 0.159 0.080 0.017 -0.038 -0.047
(0.119) (0.051) (0.039) (0.029) (0.040)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Wave e↵ect Y Y Y Y Y
N 62679 62573 62584 62679 62679
1 Coe cients are estimated from Heckman selection model (ML). Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2 Control variables include age, age square, gender, urban dummy (at 12-year-old), current urban dummy, marital status, retirement




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A.3: Exclusion Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
current hukou childhood hukou migration married retired co-habiting
CohortExposure -0.002 0.001 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003)
Sibling FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Birth cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 550 550 550 550 550 550
1 Coe cients are estimated from OLS model. Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at
the household level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
2 Outcome variables include current hukou (urban dummy), hukou in childhood (urban dummy at 12-year-old), migration




Good Bye Chiang Kai-shek? The
Long-Lasting E↵ects of Education
under the Authoritarian Regime in
Taiwan
2.1 Introduction
Existing literature suggests that people’s attitudes and ideology can be formed
through a variety of channels: family (Bisin and Verdier, 2001), media and propa-
ganda (Della Vigna and Kaplan, 2011), peer to peer (Sacerdote, 2001), etc. Educa-
tion is among the most evident ones since individuals spend almost their childhood
in schools and their core values are high likely formed during that period. In history,
there are full of examples of dictators were using schooling in particular to control
the outlook of children and young adults (Voigtlnder and Voth, 2015). As we have
known, between 1974 and 1990, many countries ended the rule of authoritarian or
autocratic regimes and shifted towards transitional or democratic regimes. However,
the end of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily mean that its impacts dis-
appear; it might still a↵ect individuals’ ideology throughout their lives. This raises
a fascinating question: does an authoritarian political regime, which a person expe-
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rienced at an early age, have long-lasting e↵ects on that person’s political outcomes
(political attitudes, voting behavior, and national identity) through an educational
channel?
In this paper, we would like to respond to this question by exploiting evidence
from an authoritarian regime and its transition in Taiwan. Historically, the leader
of the Kuomintang party (KMT), Chiang Kai-shek, took control of Taiwan in 1945
following the World War II. Then the KMT arbitrary seizure of private property and
their economic mismanagement have motivated considerable protests, resistance, and
campaigns against them, spontaneously organized by Taiwanese people (Rubinstein,
1999). The protests were violently suppressed by the KMT government, which killed
thousands of civilians. Hence the politicians of the KMT realized that it was impor-
tant to strengthen its control over people, especially youth: the KMT promulgated
not only martial law to restrict human rights,1 but also inserted pro-regime content
to the curriculum and increased the number of patriotic activities for primary and
secondary schools. The explicit goal of the KMT-led authoritarian educational sys-
tem was to impose government ideology on students: requiring unconditional support
for the KMT; promoting patriotic education, worshiping leadership as well as anti-
communism; going countero↵ensive against the mainland, etc. These goals found
their way into every single school subject (Hsu, 2007; Tsai, 2007).
According to history, the authoritarian regime had controlled Taiwan for almost
forty years until 14 July 1987, when former Taiwanese leader Chiang Ching-kuo an-
nounced the lifting of martial law, marking an o cial end of Taiwan’s authoritarian
regime.2 Since that, people have regained freedom of speech and have been able to
participate in political activities. Facing increasingly overwhelming criticism from
the masses about the political indoctrination in primary and secondary schools, the
Ministry of Education was aware of the necessity for changes in the content of the
textbook along with the dramatic political regime transition. At the same time, more
Taiwan-born people disliked the indoctrination in education for a long time and got
the power in the government and the Ministry of Education, and they had a chance
1The KMT published strict regulations to prevent assembly, association, procession, petition
and other forms of organised protest.
2It is an exogenous shock for people: no one could anticipate this event before he announced the
lifting of martial law.
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to change the “brainwashing education.” From 1 September 1987, the Ministry of
Education has required the schools sharply decreased the number of patriotic activ-
ities, deleted the indoctrination content mainly in teaching materials, and published
the revised textbooks in 1989 (the revised textbooks, hereafter), and most of the
political inculcation had been cut out.
Based on the history mentioned above, we examine the e↵ects of the authoritar-
ian education on political outcomes by exploiting the sharp decrease of ideological
content in schools after 1987 in Taiwan. Moreover, we combine a regulation pub-
lished by the government which requires children who were six years old on or before
August 31 of a given year, to enroll in elementary school by September 1 of that
year (Spohr, 2003; Tsai, 2009; Tsai, 2010). Those who were born after September 1
would only be enrolled in September of the next year. Applying this regulation, our
identification utilizes cut-o↵ birth dates for elementary school enrollment that cause
variation in the length of exposure to the authoritarian education system within the
same birth cohort. Following Fuchs-Schündeln and Masella (2016), we employ this
strategy that relies on comparison for people born on the same year, which helps
us not to face the di culty of dealing with unobserved di↵erences across cohorts.
We further include regional fixed e↵ects to control for non-time-varying confounding
variables at the regional level.3
The findings provide new evidence that an additional year of exposure to au-
thoritarian education has significant e↵ects on the outcomes of interest: it decreases
preference for democracy and election turnout rate while increasing the probability
of supporting the KMT, and reduces the likelihood of self-identifying as Taiwanese,
rather than Chinese. There is no significant di↵erence between control and treatment
groups regarding attitude toward unification with China, because there was almost
no variation of relevant content in schools before and after the lifting of martial law.
When the whole sample is divided into two parts by gender, we can see that the
coe cients for men remain significant, but for women, the long-term e↵ects disap-
pear. This could potentially be attributed to the fact that women had been excluded
from political participation since the beginning of feudal times in China, and this
3Taiwan has 22 administrative divisions, including special municipalities, cities and counties.
For easier understanding, we refer to administrative divisions as regions.
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cultural heritage persists over time. Hence receiving one more year of authoritarian
education does not have a significant e↵ect on women who are the same age.
In the last part of the empirical analysis, the robustness of the results is tested.
First, we deal with the argument that there might be other factors from society a↵ect-
ing the treatment group apart from the indoctrination in education. We use a placebo
test by using pre-cohorts (those born between 1960 and 1968), who completed all of
their education (nine-year compulsory education and the senior secondary education)
under the authoritarian regime. According to the results, none of the coe cients of
interest are statistically significant. Second, this paper performs a sensitivity test by
including more control variables, such as region-cohort fixed e↵ects, to account for
region-specific cross-cohort trends. However, the results remain unchanged.
This paper contributes to the literature on three grounds.
First, this study contributes to the literature about the long-lasting impacts of
the institutions on individual outcomes. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) ar-
gue that the communism in Germany a↵ects the individual’s preferences in the long
run. Fuchs-Schündeln and Masella (2016) find that the socialist education in East
Germany could decrease the likelihood of getting a college diploma and also has an
impact on labor market performance for males. In this study, we explore the causal
relationship between the authoritarian regime experience and political outcomes. To
the best of our knowledge, the long-term e↵ects of the political institutions on individ-
uals’ political outcomes are insu cient. Pop-Eleches and Tucker (2014) investigate
the e↵ect of the communism on political attitude and conclude that more exposure to
communism leads to more opposition to democracy and capitalism. However, they
do not provide a clear mechanism about how the regime could a↵ect the individual’s
political ideology. And we fill the gap by using the educational channel in this paper.
Second, this paper relates to the recent research on the e↵ects of curriculum and
textbooks changes. Clots-Figueras and Masella (2013) study the e↵ect of a bilingual
(Spanish and Catalan) education reform and find that respondents who have been
exposed for a longer period to teaching in Catalan have stronger Catalan feelings.
Chen et al. (2016) study the 1994 curriculum reform for junior high school social
subjects that introduced vast amounts of Taiwan-related content and conclude that
students exposed to the revised textbooks are more likely to hold a stronger Tai-
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wanese identity. Cantoni et al. (2017) explore the causal e↵ect of a new curriculum
on students’ ideology in China, and find that the new curriculum e↵ectively shape
students’ beliefs and attitudes toward the Chinese Government.
This paper is close to the Cantoni et al. (2017), but the di↵erences are as fol-
lows. Instead of a short-term e↵ect (about four years in their paper) of curriculum
changes, we focus on the long-term implications (about 23 years on average) of the
variations in the curriculum. This contributes to the existing literature since limited
study focus on the persistence of political preferences which last for more than 20
years. Second, we use a representative sample of the population, covering di↵erent
educational backgrounds, while in Cantoni et al. (2017), the analysis is conducted
on the sample of students from the best Chinese universities. The students are ex-
tremely good at studying. Given that selection issues might be present, it is unclear
whether the results would hold if the subjects are students selected from non-elite
universities (non-Project 211 universities).4 For our study, however, this is not a
concern. One significant advantage is that our dataset covers people with di↵erent
educational backgrounds, which is much more representative compared to the elites
sample used in the Cantoni et al. (2017).
Finally, this paper sheds light on historical reasons for the current Taiwanese at-
titude toward national identity and cross-strait reunification. If one wants to study
the long-term impact of authoritarian regimes, there are many potential candidates,
for example, countries in South America that experienced a wave of democratization
in the late 20th century. So why we choose Taiwan? Because Taiwan is explicitly
selected because one of our primary objectives is to find out the source of heterogene-
ity in national identity and reunification attitudes. It is well-known that historically
Taiwan has been ruled by China since the Song Dynasty, and was under Chinese
feudal rule for several centuries. But in 1949, the KMT lost the civil war, retreated
to Taiwan and established a new regime opposed to that of the Communist Party
of mainland China. From then, the two sides of the Strait have di↵erent histo-
ries. Especially since Taiwan transitioned to a democratic society, the di↵erence in
4To raise the research standards, from1995 the Ministry of Education of China launched a project
about establishing National Key Universities, which is Project 211. Now 116 higher education
institutions are designated as Project 211.
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political attitudes of the people in Taiwan and Mainland China is becoming more
and more apparent. In recent years, a significant proportion of people in Taiwan
identify as Taiwanese, rather than Chinese, and believe that Taiwan should be inde-
pendent. The notion of national identity and political policy toward mainland China
(independence or reunification) are still a quite crucial question in the light of Tai-
wanese leader elections. By exploiting a historical source of heterogeneity in national
identity and cross-strait reunification attitude, this study makes a groundbreaking
contribution to the literature on cross-strait relations as well.
The paper is structured as follows. A brief introduction of the institutional back-
ground and the educational system in Taiwan is given in section 2.2. In section
2.3 the data and the variables employed are discussed. The empirical analysis and
results are presented in section 2.4. The paper concludes with section 2.5.
2.2 Institutional Background
2.2.1 Political Regime Transition in Taiwan
The point of the political regime transition in Taiwan is critical for this study,
since estimating the impact of the political regime requires criteria to distinguish
di↵erent regimes. Based on standard practices in the political economy literature
and the discussion in Besley and Kudamatsu (2007), we use the Polity Score index
from the Polity IV dataset as demarcation criterion (Marshall and Jaggers, 2005).5
Taiwan is a small island. Aborigines had inhabited it before the Han migrated
to Taiwan. In 1895, the Qing army lost the Sino-Japanese War and ceded Taiwan
to Japan. A half-century later, the Japanese surrendered to the Allies in World War
II, and the KMT, led by Chiang Kai-shek, took control of Taiwan. Soon after the
KMT occupied Taiwan, the corrupt conduct on the part of the KMT authorities
and their massive mismanagement became evident to the local population. These
contradictions led to an anti-KMT campaign around the whole island on February
5The “Polity Score” shows a regime authority spectrum ranging from the hereditary system
(-10) to the full democracy (10). We could classify regimes in di↵erent categories: “autocracies”
(from -10 to -6), “anocracies” (from-5 to 5 ), and “democracies” (from 6 to 10).
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28, 1947. The uprising was violently put down with more than 3,000 Taiwanese elites
being killed by the KMT military (this event is known as the “228 Incident”). Then
the KMT enforced martial law to strengthen its control over the people after 1949,
where the authority trend of Figure 2.1 starts.6
It is observed in Figure 2.1 that from 1949 to 1987, the authority has a value
below -5, which indicates that Taiwan was in the authoritarian regime led by the
KMT government. The autocracy in this period was featured by the fact that Chiang
Kai-shek started one-party rule and announced the imposition of martial law in
Taiwan. In 1975, after Chiang Kai-shek’s death, his son Chiang Ching-kuo took over
the power. Although Chiang Ching-kuo intended to democratize the political system
gradually and to replace the older generation of the KMT with more politicians of
Taiwanese origin, the martial law was still valid. People’s rights and freedoms were
largely limited. Finally, Chiang lifted martial law on July 14, 1987, and it was the
end of the authoritarian regime in Taiwan. As evident from the graph, the value
jumps dramatically from -5 to about -0.5 in that year. Between 1987 and 1992,
Taiwan experienced a transitional period and people regained fundamental rights,
such as freedom to establish political parties. On the 19th of December 1992, the
election for the second Legislative Yuan was held in Taiwan, which was the first
direct legislative election in Taiwan. At this very moment that Taiwan began its
transition to an e↵ective multi-party electoral system. From that year Taiwan enters
the era of a democratic regime with a score higher than 6, and after 2004, it has a
fully democratic government.
2.2.2 Political Indoctrination Changes in Primary and Ju-
nior High Schools
As we mentioned above, after the 228 Incident, to consolidate the stability of its
rule, the KMT promulgated a series of relevant regulations to restrict civil rights,
such as citizens lost freedom of speech, assembly, association, etc. In addition to
imposing martial law, to ensure that the party’s propaganda could have an active
and lasting impact on students, the KMT emphasized control through education,
6I select the figure from Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions Project (1800-2013).
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mainly primary and junior high schools. Related document (Tsai, 2007) confirms
that the educational policy adopted by the KMT education administration committee
explicitly pointed out the significance of party-oriented education:
What we call “party-oriented education” is that under the guidance of
the KMT, education should be in line with the party’s values and ideol-
ogy... When we start to design the party-oriented educational system, we
should restructure the curriculum so as not to violate the party’s princi-
ples... And we can give full play to the role of the party and its policies.
We should quickly advance the reviewing and compiling of textbooks,
which should be a combination of the party’s ideology and educational
purposes.7
All humanities, including Chinese and social science courses, were China-centered
and KMT-oriented, strictly determined and audited by the KMT government. Text-
books, exams, degrees, and educational instructors were all controlled by the KMT
o cials. Additionally, the Ministry of Education established a new department called
the “National Institute for Compilation and Translation,” which invited many pro-
fessors and educational specialists to participate in the textbooks and curriculum
design and evaluation. Moreover, the government also arranged for “reliable” sta↵s,
such as o cials and experts who met the needs of the KMT’s o cial ideology and
decision-making, to audit teaching materials (Su, 2007).
Education under the KMT government had a unique feature not easy to per-
ceive. The course “Citizenship and Morality” for elementary students is an illustra-
tive example: when we examine the curriculum of this course, there is no significant
di↵erence between moral or civic classes in the KMT ruling period and those in the
democratic regime or transition period. However, if we carefully examine the content
of the textbooks, we can find it contains a lot of content related to authoritarian-
ism, which is quite di↵erent from the description of the curriculum. The textbooks
explain the concepts of citizenship and nations, as well as basic knowledge of laws
7Beginning in 1924, the Kuomintang had a plan to carry out a “party-oriented education” policy
in mainland China. Two years later, the KMT government formulated a draft of this policy. When
the KMT retreated from Mainland China in 1949, they began to implement this policy in Taiwan.
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and regulations citizens should obey. However, the book includes little about the
democratic regime and how it works. The purpose of education under the KMT
government was to cultivate students to become persons who obey the law and gov-
ernment decisions, not to develop their ability to participate in that decision-making
(Hsieh, 1988; Ou, 1990). Moreover, the KMT defined what constituted “citizenship
and morality,” not the laws and values accepted by an entire society, which is dif-
ferent from democratic countries’ civics education. Anything relating to democratic
regimes, citizen rights and Taiwanese identity was reduced to a minimum, or even
forbidden to be introduced. Students were deprived of learning about democratic
values and Taiwanese history.
Moreover, the KMT defined what constituted “citizenship and morality,” not the
laws and values accepted by an entire society, which was di↵erent from democratic
countries’ civics education. Anything relating to democratic regimes, citizen rights
and Taiwanese identity was reduced to a minimum, or even forbidden to be intro-
duced. Students who received the compulsory education were denied learning about
democratic values and Taiwanese history.
The liberalization and democratization of Taiwan arose after the former leader
Chiang Ching-kuo announced the lifting martial law. More and more people partic-
ipated in political activities, and all circles of society began to criticize the regime.
From an educational point of view, people were starting to express their dissatis-
faction with the political indoctrination contents in the textbooks. Criticism was
combined with various political movements, and a wave of textbooks reform followed
(Zhang, 2005). More Taiwan-born people who disliked the indoctrination in educa-
tion got the power the Ministry of Education and in the government, and they had
a chance to change the “brainwashing education”. From 1987, the Ministry of Edu-
cation had revised the elementary and junior high school textbooks and published a
revised version of the textbooks. There was much less political content in the revised
version of the books,8 as the teaching materials writing group reduced the content
praising the KMT, authoritarian regimes, Chinese mainland culture, and a sense of
8Between 1987 and 1989, because there was not enough time to delete the indoctrination content
mostly, the elementary and junior high schools still used the old textbooks with a minor change:
the indoctrination content reduced, but not largely.
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Chinese national identity, while incorporating more aboriginal cultures as well as
western democracy knowledge.
Distinguishing the standard teaching content and political indoctrination in the
textbooks is complicated. It is worth noting that from 1992 the pedagogical academia
of Taiwan began to measure and compare the intensity of political indoctrination
under authoritarian and transitional regimes, and published a series of pedagogical
literature is considered very informative and reliable. Scholars have used various
methods to identify political indoctrination and a large amount of pedagogical lit-
erature (Lin, 1993; Wang, 1996; Tsai, 2007; Lau, 2000) studied the political incul-
cation of compulsory education during martial law period, distinguishing standard
and ideological parts by the phrases, sentences, statements, examples, and stories
that appeared in the textbooks. In general, experts divide the texts into di↵erent
paragraphs according to the content, then determine whether a paragraph contains
ideological content. If yes, then scholars decide which type of political socialization
the paragraph belongs to, and record the number of the occurrences.
According to Lin (2000), Lau (2000), Wang (1996) and Tsai (2007), by comparing
the content of ideology in the social science textbooks of elementary school during
martial law period (1978 edition, “the old textbooks”) and the revised textbooks, the
occurrences of topics related to patriotic sentiment, authoritarian structure, worship
of political leaders, anti-mainland sentiments, spiritual constructions, authoritarian
political values, and Chinese culture were significantly less after the lifting of martial
law.9 Figure 2.2 below shows that a vast majority of the ideological content was
reduced in the revised textbooks.10
The vertical axis represents the frequency of ideological content in the old and
revised textbooks, and the horizontal axis represents the type of ideological content.
The blue histogram stands for the old textbooks, while the orange histogram repre-
sents the revised books. It is evident that all the types of political ideology content
9Other scholars use di↵erent political subject classification, but the conclusions are consistent
with Liu et al. (2000), suggesting that the political ideology in the textbooks has decreased dra-
matically after 1987.
10There is no information on the variations happened in each grade, hence the bars show average
changes of the political ideology content of primary school.
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have reduced sharply in the revised textbooks.11
Of particular interest here is the content of the textbooks related to Taiwan: the
revised textbooks for primary and junior high school students, the emphasis was
still on China’s geography and history. However, the material about the history of
Taiwan and political and cultural aspects of both sides of the Taiwan Strait has
been greatly increased. The newly added content on Taiwan may provide students
a di↵erent understanding of national identity.12 In summary, the dramatic changes
to the curriculum along with the political transition allows us to observe a di↵erence
between treatment group and control group, as explained in the next section.
2.2.3 The Educational System in Taiwan
This section introduces the educational system briefly in Taiwan.
The government extended compulsory education from six to nine years after 1968,
and all school-age children are required to attend and finish primary school (6 years)
and junior high school (3 years). This compulsory rule enables us to keep almost
all the observations in the surveys, given the fact that all individuals, both in the
treatment and control groups went to school and were exposed to the authoritarian
educational system. Eliminating the concern that some people in the treatment
group were not in fact treated because they did not even go to school.
Another feature of compulsory schooling in Taiwan that relates to our study is
that the new semester begins on the 1st of September. According to Spohr (2003)
and Tsai (2010), children who are already six years old before September 1 of a given
year must be enrolled in first grade in that year. Similarly, students who are 12 years
old before or on August 31 must be enrolled in junior high school in September of
11Although scholars have not yet compared the changes in the political ideology of junior high
school social subjects textbooks after martial law was abolished, several studies (Tsai, 2007; Xue,
2000) have analyzed the changes in the revised textbooks “Civil and Moral (Politics)” and find
that in the 1989 version, the content of authorities and anti-mainland sentiments have drastically
declined. Among them, there has been a drastic reduction in the content of the KMT leader
worship.
12It should be noted here that the 1989 edition is a blueprint for the 1994 new curriculum and
experimental teaching materials. The 1994 new curriculum contains a vast material understanding
Taiwan, and has an even greater impact on students’ national identity (Chen et al., 2016).
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that year.
2.3 Dataset and Variables
The micro-level data used in this paper is from the Taiwan Social Change Survey
(TSCS), which is a longitudinal survey that tracks political, socio-economic, and
cultural changes in Taiwan. This interdisciplinary cross-sectional survey, as one of
the largest survey series among general social studies in the world, began in 1985,
enabling us to understand its socio-economic change from long-term perspectives.
Main topics across surveys include political participation, national identity, family
status, economic attitudes, social networks, physical and mental health, religion, etc.
By 2016 the TSCS had accumulated 58 surveys with approximately 121,000 face-to-
face interviews. To summarize, TSCS is considered one of the most authoritative
datasets in Taiwan.
2.3.1 Outcome Variables
We select nine waves from the TSCS dataset, which contain the following out-
come variables of interest, then choose a group of questions from the TSCS dataset,
which asked respondents many questions about an individual’s political attitude and
national identity.
Preference for Democracy The main variable of interest is the preference for a
democratic regime, which comes from the following survey question: “Which of the
following three statements do you agree with? a) Democracy is preferable to other
forms of government; b) Under some circumstance, an authoritarian government can
be preferable to a democratic one; c) For people like me, it does not matter whether
we have a democratic regime or not.”
We create a dummy Pref.Democracy that equals one if a respondent answers
a), and zero if a respondent answers b),13 to measure whether an interviewee has
13Following Burm (2018), we also create a dummy that equals one if individual answers a), and
zero if a resplendent answer b) and c) , the result does not alter much and remains significant.
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a preference for democracy over any other kind of regimes. During the period that
martial law was enforced, most of the content in Politics and Chinese textbooks
complimented the benefit about authoritarian regimes (Tsai, 2007; Lau, 2000), for
instance: “having one ruler or limited numbers of elites to decide on a↵airs regarding
a country and without influences of others parties makes it easier for the ruler to
make decisions in the interest of the nation. Moreover, in emergency cases where
quick action is required, decisions can be carried out immediately”. After martial law
was lifted, the educational specialists who designed the textbooks gradually replaced
such content advocating authoritarian regimes gradually with the introduction of
democratic values.
Party A liation To measure the outcome of an individual’s party a liation, Sup-
portKMT is a dummy created from the response to the question: Which political
party do you support? The answer includes main political parties in Taiwan nowa-
days: the KMT, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the Taiwan Solidarity
Union (TSU), the People First Party (PFP) and so forth. The variable Support-
KMT takes the value one if an interviewee self-reports as a KMT supporter, zero as
a non-KMT supporter.14 This variable is closely related to the ideological content
before 1987: there was much pro-KMT content in the old textbooks, which required
students to “unswervingly follow the absolute leadership of the KMT, follow to the
directions set by the party and obey its command (Tsai, 2007; Chen, 2006)”. The
Ministry of Education deleted a large percentage of this pro-KMT content between
1987 and 1995.
Political Participation For political participation measures, the TSCS asks re-
spondents whether they turned out and voted, exercising their fundamental rights.
The value of the binary variable Turnout is based on the response to this question:
Did you turn out to vote in the most recent Taiwanese leader election? If the answer
is yes, we set the value of Turnout as one, otherwise it is zero. In the transition pe-
14Other related variables include “In the last Taiwanese leader / legislator election, which can-
didate(s)/party did you vote for?” We have created a series of dummies that equal to one if the
respondent voted for candidate(s) from the KMT or gave their party vote to the KMT, zero for
other party candidates. The results are reported in the appendix.
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riod, the revised textbooks covered basic knowledge of elections, and students were
taught to participate in class committee elections, but the old textbooks did not
provide information about what is a free and fair election, how citizens can select
government leaders, or the set of policies that the government will follow. The notion
of democracy taught from the book was partial and limited (Xu, 2016). After lifting
of martial law in 1987, knowledge about western democracy was introduced, such as
respect for political rights and civil liberties, majority franchise.
National Identity and Attitude towards Unification The ordinal variable
TaiwaneseIdentity is given the value of two when the respondent choose Taiwanese,
1 if one declares he/she is both Taiwanese and Chinese, and zero if they choose Chi-
nese. In the old curriculum, politics, history, and geography courses focused more
on China and taught students that they were Chinese citizens. It also claimed that
the aborigines were all formerly residents of Mainland China. After 1987, the pro-
portion of Chinese ideology and culture in the textbooks were replaced gradually by
content about Taiwan, which included awareness of the ethnic and cultural diversity
of aborigines.15
Similarly, the opinion about Unification comes from the following question: “Do
you support unification with China?” Unification takes the value two if the respon-
dent chooses “Unification”, value one for the option “Keeping the status quo,”and
zero for “Independence.” The old and revised textbooks compiled and published in
the 1980s always highlighted the legality of the Republic of China (ROC) and illus-
trate that the KMT government has sovereignty over all of China, including both
Taiwan and Mainland China. Moreover, before 2000, no information related to Tai-
wan’s legal independence from China appeared in textbooks so there should be no
variation between the old and revised textbooks.
15As mentioned earlier, the topic Knowing Taiwan was introduced not only by the revised text-
books but also by the subsequent 1994 edition, which also resulted in variations in self-declared
national identity depending on the curriculum to which that individual was exposed.
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2.3.2 Explanatory Variable
The variable of interest is constructed by exploiting the cut-o↵ date of birth for
school enrollment that results in variation in the length of exposure to the KMT’s
authoritarian regime within the same birth cohort, following the method by Fuchs-
Schündeln and Masella (2016).
Children turning six before September 1 of a certain year are allowed to enroll
in primary school by September 1 of that year. Hence, we define individuals born in
year b before September 1 as the treatment group, and those born after September 1
as the control group. The di↵erence between students in the treatment and control
groups is that for any birth cohort b still in education at the time when martial
law was lifted and subsequently strong political indoctrination was reduced in July
1987, treated interviewees are one year more advanced in school, and thus one year
more exposed to an authoritarian educational system than non-treated respondents
who enrolled in schools one year later. By comparing individuals born early and
late in the same year and still in schools when the transition of regimes occurred,
we compare groups a↵ected di↵erentially by the length of exposure to authoritarian
education.
2.3.3 Data Statistics
We restrict our sample to respondents who were born between 1972 and 1980,
inclusive. People who were born in or after 1981 did not experience any education
under the authoritarian regime. Similarly, individuals who born in or before 1971 had
their compulsory schooling entirely with political indoctrination. Only observations
of individuals born in this time span allow us to exploit the variation of exposure
within birth-cohorts.
After defining treatment and control groups, data statistics that describes the
socio-demographic features of the survey respondents is presented in Panel A of Table
2.1. Columns 2-3 show the main characteristics of respondents in the treated and
untreated respondents. We further check for the balance of observable demographic
characteristics across these two groups. In Panel A, columns 4 and 5, we show the
raw di↵erences, and the p-values testing for the statistical significance of these raw
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di↵erences in features of interviewees who stayed in authoritarian education for one
more or one less year in our sample. We can see the samples in two groups share
very similar social economic and demographic characteristics.16
In Panel B of Table 2.1, the statistics of our outcome variables of interest are
presented. It is worth emphasizing that for outcome variables there are statistically
significant di↵erences between the treatment group and the control group.17 The
results suggest that our main dependent variables (except for variable Unification)
are significantly di↵erent among treated and control groups whose observable char-
acteristics look identical, indicating that the di↵erence is very likely to be driven by
the treatment.
2.4 Empirical Analysis
Using the survey data, we estimate a model that includes birth cohort, region of
origin and wave fixed e↵ects, and examines the impact of the length of being exposed
to the KMT-led education. The baseline specification is the following:
Yibcw = ↵ +  Treati + ⌘b +  c +  w +  Xi + ✏ibcw
where Y is the outcomes of the individual i, and Treati is a dummy variable
that equals 1 if the respondent was born before September 1. Xi represents a vector
of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of individuals listed in Table 2.1.
Birth cohort fixed e↵ects ⌘b capture any common characteristics held by all persons
in the same birth year cell. These fixed e↵ects account for cohort-specific beliefs and
preferences: this would include, for example, cases in which younger cohorts may
be “more democratic” than older cohorts. Birth cohort fixed e↵ects capture gener-
16In columns 6 and 7 of Panel A we show di↵erences between interviewees in the two groups,
conditional on birth cohort and region fixed e↵ects, and the p-values testing for the statistical
significance of these conditional di↵erences. Conditional on common features in the administrative
division of origin (measured by the region they lived in at the age of 15) common characteristics of
a cohort, those respondents are nearly identical on observable characteristics.
17Even when region and birth cohort fixed e↵ects are controlled for, the di↵erences between main
outcome variables still remain significant, as shown in columns 6 and 7, Panel B. The findings from
these two columns are quite impressive.
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ational, slow-moving changes in beliefs and preferences. Still, this implies assuming
cohort specificities are common across all regions. Likewise, region fixed e↵ects  c
account for common characteristics held by individuals from a given region, irrespec-
tive of the year in which they were born. These fixed e↵ects account for di↵erences
across counties that do not change over time and that are common across all cohorts
born in the region, which includes, for instance, di↵erences in folk custom, religion,
indigenous heritage, etc.  w stand for wave fixed e↵ects, which capture the trend in
beliefs and preferences of the whole island in the survey years. ✏ is an error term.
The baseline model allows addressing of a set of concerns on the identification of
the causal e↵ects of exposure to education in an authoritarian background. A first
concern is a possibility of political preferences evolving and changing across cohorts
independently of political regimes. As stated before, the inclusion of birth cohort
fixed e↵ects eases this concern, though it implies restricting the cohort coe cients
to be the same across Taiwan. Likewise, region fixed e↵ects account for structural
di↵erences across counties that do not alter over time and that are common across all
cohorts born in the region. Still, there may be idiosyncratic shocks that a↵ect only
certain counties in given years, so the identification strategy is based on variation at
the region-cohort cell: a shock that has an impact on a specific region in a specific
year would threaten the identification strategy only if it has di↵erential e↵ects across
cohorts. We use controls for region-specific, cross-cohort trends in the robustness
checks.
A second concern arises from parents’ political preferences, which means chil-
dren’s political attitudes do not come from schools, but also from or mainly from
their parents’ political preferences. We also included the dummies whether the par-
ents are native Taiwanese (people who lived in Taiwan prior to the KMT’s took over
from Japanese rule, most of whom were dissatisfied with the policies of the KMT) or
Mainlanders (people who moved from mainland China to Taiwan after 1945, most of
whom are faithful supporters of the KMT) as control variables, which are good proxy
variables for parental political preferences. After controlling for these variables, the
result does not alter and remains significant. Hence parental preference factors do
not threaten the identification strategy.
There are some challenges remaining, such as the unobservable e↵ects from the
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society that might have larger e↵ects than the variation in the educational program.
We will explain these in detail in the robustness checks section.
2.4.1 Baseline Results
We run probit and ordered-probit models instead of a linear probability model
(LPM) on all outcomes for the following reasons. First, the specification is very likely
to be non-linear: intuitively, the di↵erence between 0 and 1 year of exposure might be
lower than the di↵erence between 8 and 9 years of exposure. Second, two dependent
variables are ordinal variables, and using a linear probability model complicates the
interpretation of the findings. All results stay robust when a LPM is estimated.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show the results of the main specification, controlling for the
variables listed above. Instead of raw coe cients obtained from the regression, we
report the marginal e↵ects, namely dF/dx, which are directly interpretable, with the
two-way cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Being exposed to one more
year of authoritarian education is found to yield a marginally significant negative
impact on an individual’s preference for democracy, reducing the probability of re-
porting that democracy is preferable to other forms of the regime by 6%, as shown
in columns (1)-(2) of Table 2.2. The estimation results presented in columns (3)-(4)
indicate that being in the treatment group on average decreases the likelihood of
turning out to vote in the last election by around 4%-5%, showing a strong nega-
tive e↵ect on political participation, which is in line with the finding of reduction in
satisfaction with democracy. In contrast to the first estimates, one additional year
of authoritarian education increases the probability of supporting the KMT by 3%,
indicating direct indoctrination in education at a young age does a↵ect the forma-
tion of an individual’s party a liation. In Table 2.3, other estimates are shown with
the order-probit model. From columns (1)-(3), we can see that the treated group
is 3.8% less likely to identify as Taiwanese, while 3.2% more likely to self-report as
dual identity, and 0.6% more likely to report as Chinese, compared with interviewees
in the control group. From the results above, it is inferred that since the textbooks
used during the authoritarian regime fostered the formation of a pro-ruler ideology
and behavioral patterns, those who enrolled one year earlier in primary and junior
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high schools were exposed to a more prolonged impact of indoctrinated education,
which had a long-lasted impact on their political attitudes and preferences.
Concerning unification with China, there is actually no di↵erence between the
two groups. There were no changes in this notion before and after 1987 in schools.
Even in the society, few people held the concept of independence, so from the results,
we can see the coe cients of our interests are insignificant.
We also report the marginal e↵ect of control variables to have a brief look at
which variables correlate with the formation of one’s political attitudes. It seems
parental education does not play an important role, while parental origin does. Chil-
dren of parents of Taiwanese origin are less likely to support KMT and instead are
more likely to identify as Taiwanese and have a positive attitude towards indepen-
dence. We safely infer that by controlling for Taiwan-born father (father is native
Taiwanese) and Taiwan-born mother (mother is native Taiwanese), we capture the
intergenerational transmission of political attitudes. For other control variables, such
as age, gender, etc., the direction of their e↵ects on outcomes fits our expectations.
When our observations are split into males and females, as shown in Table 2.4,
the e↵ect for men remains significant, but for women who were also in schools and
exposed to the authoritarian content of education, the long-term e↵ects disappear.
According to the results, there are no apparent di↵erences between women born
in the same year in two both groups. The reason could potentially be attributed
to the fact that women had been excluded from political participation since the
beginning of feudal times in China, and this cultural heritage plays a long-term
role. Besides unfavorable cultural biases, women are more likely to face practical
barriers to entering politics, including lower levels of education, less access to political
information, larger burden of family responsibilities, and a deprivation of rights that
has left them with fewer opportunities to acquire political experience. Therefore,
women who were born in the same year are not very sensitive to di↵erent intensity
of treatment.
Another concern needs to be addressed here: after the lifting of martial law in
1987, the number of patriotic activities in schools reduced sharply, but the text-
books were not immediately revised. Instead, the revised version textbooks were
fully implemented in 1989. However, someone might argue that the changes in the
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educational program do not play an essential role between 1987 and 1989.
To rule out this threat, we provide quantitative evidence. We choose 1989, the
year in which the revised textbooks were published, instead of 1987, as a cut-o↵.
Then we select cohorts born from 1974 to 1980 to run the baseline regression.18 The
results are shown in Table 2.5. Only a few estimates remain significant, indicating
that the reduction in political propaganda activities plays an important role. More-
over, the results also show that samples within the same birth cohort who received
di↵erent treatment between 1987 and 1989 are very crucial to our findings. Exclud-
ing them leads to the insignificance of some estimates. Similarly, we choose those
who were born between 1973 to 1981 (the year 1988 as a cut-o↵) to run the same
regression, the outcomes of which are reported in column (3) and column (6) of Table
2.5. The result of the exercise shows that, though the introduction of the revised
textbooks in 1989 has di↵erent e↵ects on the two groups, the total impact is not as
significant as suggested by the estimation using 1987 as a cuto↵. To sum up, we can
infer that from 1987 to 1989, although the textbooks have not mainly changed, the
number of patriotic activities in schools indeed decreased: the elimination of a great
deal patriotic and party propaganda activities indeed has the long-term e↵ects on
political outcomes.
There is also a concern about heterogeneous about the sample a↵ected by changes
in the educational program. Due to the limited number of observations in each grade,
we classify two major grade groups (To choose those from first to fourth grade when
the martial law was lifted in 1987 as a junior group; from the fourth to ninth grade
as a senior group). From Table 2.6 we know that for the most variables: the impacts
of the revised textbooks have significant e↵ects on the senior group. These kids
(10-15) were not only older than those in the junior group but also had a better
understanding of the ideological content of the textbooks, which played a vital role
in shaping students’ worldview and personal ideology.
18In the baseline model, we choose the year 1987 as a cut-o↵ so that we restrict our sample to
respondents who were born between 1972 and 1980; now we use the year 1989 (two years later) as
a cut-o↵, so now we choose the individuals who were born between 1974 and 1980. To approximate




Omitted variables may correlate with both our interested variable and political
outcomes, such as human capital accumulation, and these factors may confound the
e↵ect of di↵erent intensity of treatment. People may argue that there exist other
channels instead of the ideological content in textbooks that link enrollment age and
outcomes of interest, and name several candidates: years of schooling/the level of
educational attainment, income, and types of occupation. Nevertheless, we still can
perform a sensitivity test by controlling these variables. Adding these variables, if
the explanatory variables of interest lost their significance, it suggests that the e↵ects
are driven by the revised textbook which leads to better human capital achievement
rather than the decreasing content of authoritarian regime. However, after control-
ling for these individual-level characteristics, the coe cients of our interest do not
lose significance in Table 2.7 so that we can rule out these potential threats. More-
over, we also use years of schooling, earnings and job type as outcome variables.
From Table 2.7, we could see that the coe cients of main interest are insignificant,
and most of them are close to zero.19
2.4.3 Robustness Checks
In this part, we attempt to rule out other alternatives to our interpretation of
estimates, and verify the robustness of the results to solve the issues addressed above:
1) Heterogeneous impacts of time-varying shocks; 2) The confounding variables.
Including region-specific cross-cohort trends One may still argue that time-
varying elements/shocks which happened in di↵erent regions might have di↵erent
e↵ects within the same birth cohort. Moreover, even in the same region, the e↵ects
of exogenous shocks on di↵erent cohorts might be di↵erent. A vivid example of
such a shock is the so-called “Henry Liu Case”, which took place in 1984. Henry
Liu was a vocal critic of the KMT. He was assassinated in the United States by
19Another argument is the age trends drive the e↵ects above. People who were born at the
beginning of the year (Jan.) are di↵erent from those who were born in December because they might
have various age trends. Hence, we allow for age trends by including birth month information. After
we put birth month gap as controls, the results do not alter (results are available upon request).
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Bamboo Union members trained by the KMT military intelligence. After the news
came to Taiwan, people were disgruntled by the assassination of Democrats. Due to
imperfect informational transmission at that time, it is likely that students in Taipei
were better informed about the event than students in Kaohsiung; and even in the
same place, the shock might have di↵erent e↵ects on various cohorts: senior students
were likely to be more interested in the news than juniors. Independently from
whether the region-cohort variation caused by exogenous shocks is sharp or smooth,
they represent unobserved factors that may threaten the identification strategy. To
explore this possibility, we estimate the model that contains a full set of region-birth
cohort fixed e↵ects, which control for these region-specific, cross-cohort trends in
political outcomes across cohorts as shown in Table 2.8. We can see that controlling
for region-specific cross-cohort trends does not qualitatively a↵ect any estimates of
the e↵ects of changes in political indoctrination in the textbooks.
Unobservable omitted variables It might be the case that some confounding
factors, such as changes in social environment have larger e↵ects on political outcomes
than changes in the revised textbooks. Trying to address this issue, we use a sample
of those born between 1960 and 1968 as the placebo group. The samples in the
placebo group were fully exposed to education under the authoritarian educational
system and had already finished primary or junior high schools when martial law was
lifted. Therefore, they were not a↵ected di↵erentially by the authoritarian education
but would face similar factors driven by these confounding variables from society.
According to the results of Table 2.9, none of the coe cients of interest are significant
for the placebo groups.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper sheds light on the long-run impacts of political regimes on individuals’
the political outcome, exploiting evidence from the rapid reduction in the party-
oriented content of the educational system in Taiwan. The historical event provides
a unique setting to understand how the political regime a↵ects individuals through
education. Based on the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) dataset, we find that
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the features of the authoritarian education system to have a long-lasting influence
on those students, who are now their middle age. Our results suggest that one
more year of exposure to ideological education reduces preference for democracy and
election turn-out rate while increasing the support for the KMT. Meanwhile, as the
old program contain much more Chinese ideology, those who received an additional
year with the old program would consider themselves to be Chinese rather than
Taiwanese. Moreover, it turns out that attitudes towards unity and independence
are, on average, the same among treated and control groups.
This paper is not only the first paper that uses quantitative methods to study
Taiwan’s authoritarian regime and its long-term influence but also is one of the first
to provide potential historical reasons for the Taiwanese people’s current attitude
towards national identity and cross-strait reunification. We exploit within birth co-
hort estimation since the di↵erence for people born in the same year is not large.
A further advantage is that this paper employs many ways to address the possi-
ble threats to identification. For observable variables that may be correlated with
both enrollment age and outcome variables, such as years of schooling, salary, and
occupation, we find that these factors were not significantly related to the age of
enrollment. For confounding factors, we run placebo tests, and find the e↵ect is
statistically insignificant.
Furthermore, our results o↵er new evidence to support a range of historical work
arguing that education can play a crucial role in forming national identities (Weber,
1976; Clots-Figueras and Masella, 2013; Alesina and Reich, 2013). We believe that
the attitude towards the national identity that individuals make regarding educa-
tional content deserve further study.
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Figure 2.1: Political Regimes Change in Taiwan (Polity IV)
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All Control Treated Unconditional Conditional
Sep.-Dec. Jan.-Aug. Di↵. p-value Di↵. p-value
Panel A
Age 32.13 32.33 32.01 -0.321 0.134 -0.168 0.369
(5.411) (5.519) (5.347)
Male 0.511 0.504 0.516 0.012 0.533 0.002 0.931
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Taiwan-born father 0.905 0.912 0.901 -0.011 0.377 -0.015 0.204
(0.293) (0.284) (0.298)
Taiwan-born mother 0.958 0.953 0.961 0.008 0.275 0.007 0.372
(0.200) (0.212) (0.192)
Father edu. (years) 8.285 8.289 8.283 -0.006 0.972 -0.156 0.371
(4.493) (4.458) (4.514)
Mother edu. (years) 7.006 6.973 7.024 0.051 0.772 0.091 0.601
(4.479) (4.429) (4.508)
Religious 0.701 0.715 0.693 -0.022 0.213 -0.021 0.235
(0.458) (0.452) (0.462)
Urban 0.840 0.839 0.841 0.002 0.840 -0.002 0.888
(0.366) (0.368) (0.365)
Married 0.548 0.538 0.553 0.015 0.429 0.028 0.131
(0.498) (0.499) (0.497)
Treated 0.639 0 1 1 - - -
(0.480)
#obs. 2763 997 1766
Panel B
Pref. for democracy 0.580 0.615 0.560 -0.055 0.068 -0.053 0.084
(0.494) (0.487) (0.497)
Turn-out 0.779 0.807 0.762 -0.046 0.010 -0.042 0.023
(0.415) (0.395) (0.426)
Support for KMT 0.322 0.301 0.334 0.034 0.063 0.041 0.029
(0.467) (0.459) (0.472)
National identity (0-2) 1.561 1.601 1.537 -0.064 0.009 -0.055 0.027
(0.560) (0.543) (0.569)
Support unification (0-2) 0.916 0.895 0.929 0.034 0.218 0.036 0.196
(0.577) (0.599) (0.564)
1 Columns 4 and 5 report raw (unconditional) di↵erences in means across cohort, and the p-value for a t-test of di↵erences in
means. Columns 6 and 7 report di↵erences conditional on birth cohort and region fixed e↵ects.
2 “Father edu.” and “Mother edu.” are measured by parental years of schooling. Other control variables are dummies.
3 “Democracy”(#obs: 1646) appears only in wave 2000, 2004, 2005, 2010 and 2015; “Re-unification”(#obs: 2042) and “Taiwanese
identity”(#obs: 1990) dummies show only in wave 2000, 2004, 2005, 2010, 2013, 2014, 2015; “Turnout”(#obs: 2701) and
“Support KMT”(#obs: 2699) are dummies that exist in every wave.
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Table 2.2: Baseline Results I
Probit Model
Preference for democracy Turn-out Support KMT
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat -0.059* -0.058* -0.051*** -0.043** 0.032* 0.034*
(0.032) (0.030) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Age -0.003 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.003) (.) (0.020) (.) (0.002) (.)
Male -0.006 -0.006 -0.031* -0.026 -0.039** -0.026
(0.028) (0.028) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Taiwan-born father -0.059 -0.061 0.003 -0.004 -0.158*** -0.160***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033)
Taiwan-born mother 0.116 0.108 0.024 0.045 -0.065 -0.057
(0.094) (0.094) (0.052) (0.050) (0.052) (0.051)
Father edu. 0.000 0.001 0.008** 0.007* 0.005 0.004
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Mother edu. -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.004 0.005 0.007*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Religious 0.017 0.015 0.047** 0.053*** 0.033 0.026
(0.032) (0.032) (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Married -0.122*** -0.123*** -0.002 0.008 0.012 0.009
(0.032) (0.032) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021)
Urban 0.041 0.041 0.023 0.017 0.043 0.032
(0.045) (0.046) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) (0.030)
Birth cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Wave FE N Y N Y N Y
N 1126 1126 2054 2054 2498 2498
Pseudo R2 0.1967 0.2049 0.1452 0.1804 0.1658 0.1735
Figures without brackets are marginal e↵ects, namely dF/dx. Two-way cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant
at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2.3: Baseline Results II
Ordered Probit Model
National identity Support for unification
Taiwanese Both Chinese Unification Status quo Indep.
Treat -0.038* 0.032* 0.006** -0.013 -0.001 0.003
(0.020) (0.017) (0.003) (0.016) (0.005) (0.017)
Age 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Male -0.093*** 0.080*** 0.013*** 0.041*** 0.016*** -0.057***
(0.019) (0.016) (0.030) (0.012) (0.005) (0.016)
Taiwan-born father 0.144*** -0.124*** -0.020*** -0.084*** -0.032*** 0.117***
(0.033) (0.029) (0.005) (0.022) (0.010) (0.031)
Taiwan-born mother 0.137*** -0.118*** -0.019** -0.059* -0.023* 0.081*
(0.051) (0.044) (0.007) (0.036) (0.014) (0.049)
Father edu. -0.006* 0.005* 0.001 0.004** 0.002** -0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.003)
Mother edu. -0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Religious -0.037 0.032 0.005 -0.019 -0.007 0.026
(0.023) (0.020) (0.003) (0.015) (0.006) (0.021)
Married -0.016 0.013 0.002 0.013 0.001 -0.002
(0.023) (0.021) (0.003) (0.013) (0.001) (0.018)
Urban -0.087* 0.066* 0.010* 0.026 0.010 -0.036
(0.039) (0.034) (0.006) (0.023) (0.009) (0.031)
Birth cohort FE Y Y
Region FE Y Y
Controls & Wave FE Y Y
N 1979 2009
Pseudo R2 0.2021 0.1146
Figures without brackets are marginal e↵ects, namely dF/dx. Two-way cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant
at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2.4: Results by Gender
Dep.Var.
Pref. for democracy Turn-out Support KMT
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Treat -0.071* -0.038 -0.046* -0.037 0.051* 0.002
(0.042) (0.043) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
Birth cohort & region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls & wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 687 683 1346 1319 1342 1321
Pseudo R2 0.2774 0.3363 0.2567 0.2896 0.2398 0.2561
Dep.Var.
Taiwanese Identity Support unification
Male Female Male Female
Treat -0.076** -0.016 0.065 -0.013
(0.027) (0.027) (0.043) (0.040)
Birth cohort & region FE Y Y Y Y
Controls & Wave FE Y Y Y Y
N 2237 836 1934 842
Figures without brackets are marginal e↵ects, namely dF/dx. Two-way cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
The variable TaiwaneseIdentity, which is an ordinal variable, is given the value 2 when the respondent chooses Taiwanese,
1 if one declares he/she is both Taiwanese and Chinese, and 0 if one prefers Chinese. Here I report only the estimates of
e↵ects on one’s Taiwanese identity for simplicity. The same for Unification
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Table 2.5: Cut-o↵s Rather than 1987
Dep.Var.
Pref. for democracy Turn-out
1989 as cut-o↵ 1988 as cut-o↵ 1989 as cut-o↵ 1988 as cut-o↵
1974-1980 1974-1982 1973-1981 1974-1980 1974-1982 1973-1981
Treat -0.057* -0.033 -0.054* -0.044** -0.043** -0.044**
(0.034) (0.030) (0.028) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019)
Birth cohort & region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls & Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1202 1430 1191 1927 2062 1928
Dep.Var.
Support KMT Taiwanese Identity
1989 as cut-o↵ 1988 as cut-o↵ 1989 as cut-o↵ 1988 as cut-o↵
1974-1980 1974-1982 1973-1981 1974-1980 1974-1982 1973-1981
Treat 0.028 0.032* 0.030* -0.029 -0.036* -0.040**
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019)
Birth cohort & region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls & Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 2361 2408 2375 1171 1279 1271
Two-way cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
The variable TaiwaneseIdentity, which is an ordinal variable, is given the value 2 when the respondent chooses Taiwanese, 1 if one declares he/she
is both Taiwanese and Chinese, and 0 if one prefers Chinese. Here I report only the estimates of e↵ects on one’s Taiwanese identity for simplicity.
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Table 2.6: Heterogeneous Treatment E↵ects
Turnout Support KMT Taiwanese Identity
Senior group Junior group Senior group Junior group Senior group Junior group
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat -0.050* -0.004 0.051* 0.002 -0.070** -0.012
(0.028) (0.006) (0.028) (0.006) (0.026) (0.015)
Birth cohort & region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Controls & Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 1200 983 1370 1125 1182 968
Two-way cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
The variable Taiwanese identity, which is an ordinal variable, is given the value 2 when the respondent chooses Taiwanese, 1 if one declares he/she is both
Taiwanese and Chinese, and 0 if one prefers Chinese. Here I report only the estimates of e↵ects on one’s Taiwanese identity for simplicity.
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Table 2.7: Confounding Factors: Education and Job Profiles
Years of Schooling Log Income Job Type
O cials Professionists Workers
Treat -0.140 0.002 0.003 0.011 -0.014
(0.095) (0.020) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018)
Birth cohort FE Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y
Controls & Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y
N 2780 2702 927 625 1228
Job type is based on ISCO-08 occupations code, which has 9 major groups. Using these 9 binary dummies directly does not
alter the conclusion.Two-way cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2.8: Robustness Checks: Birth-cohort ⇥ Region FE
Pref. democracy Turn-out Support KMT Taiwanese Identity Unification
Cuto↵ -0.098** -0.039* 0.069** -0.014 0.029
(0.040) (0.023) (0.036) (0.040) (0.028)
Controls & Wave FE Y Y Y Y Y
Birth cohort & region FE Y Y Y Y Y
Birth cohort ⇥ region FE Y Y Y Y Y
N 1126 2054 2498 2045 1725
Two-way cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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Table 2.9: Regressions for Placebo Cohort Groups
Pref. for democracy Turn-out Support KMT
1960-1968 1960-1968 1960-1968
Treat 0.022 0.022 0.008
(0.028) (0.017) (0.020)
Birth cohort & region FE Y Y Y
Controls & Wave FE Y Y Y





Birth cohort & region FE Y Y
Controls & Wave FE Y Y
N 737 562
Two-way cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
The variable Taiwanese identity, which is an ordinal variable, is given the value 2 when the respondent
chooses Taiwanese, 1 if one declares he/she is both Taiwanese and Chinese, and 0 if one prefers Chinese.
Here I report only the estimates of e↵ects on one’s Taiwanese identity for simplicity. The same idea for the




Northeast China during the Qing
Dynasty
3.1 Introduction
The possibility of a fertility inhibition model emerging in pre-modern China has
generated widespread controversies among historical demographers. Malthus (1798)
believed that the suppression of population growth in ancient China had been mainly
caused by involuntary positive checks such as war, famine, and infectious diseases.
While since the 1990s, younger-generation historians such as James Lee, William
Lavely, and Cameron Campbell have reinterpreted the history of population growth
since the Qing dynasty (1644-1911),1 holding the view that the restrained births had
occurred in China and internal fertility controls played a greater role in comparison
to external inhibitors.2 To tackle the long debate on the timing and origins behind
1These scholars have explored records of the Qing royal family, and household registers of vil-
lagers from Dao Yi, Liaoning.
2They suggested that Chinese families, influenced by an unintended consequence of children’s
competition for limited household resources, engaged in postnatal abortion and other contraceptive
methods to control their fertility rates. However, Cao and Chen (2002; 2003) point out that the
role of infanticide due to budget constraints cannot fully explain the dramatic decrease in male
children during this period, since the boy preference in China made male infanticide minimal.
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fertility controls in the male population in ancient China, this paper attempts to
argue that the fertility restrictions happened and were based on rational parental
decisions in accumulating human capitals. With high returns to education and an
improved access to educational resources for ordinary people in the northeastern
region, parents invested more in human capital by reducing the number of children
they planned on having.
Our argument employs the quantity-quality trade-o↵ theory, where parents lim-
ited their number of children to increase the quality of each of them, as portrayed
by Becker (1960) and Becker and Lewis (1973). Being a key feature in the transition
from Malthusian stagnation to modern economic growth as considered by long-term
growth theories (Galor and Weil, 2000; Galor, 2011), the trade-o↵ was accompanied
by various underlying mechanisms, including the technological progress (Galor and
Moav, 2002), income elasticity of preferences and demand for human capital (Ferni-
hough, 2017). Although there is considerable debate on whether the quantity-quality
relationship ever existed in industrialized countries in the midst of their demographic
transition, the related literature on the Chinese social and economic history seems
insu cient, mainly due to the lack of data on pre-modern China.
In the literature, using data from genealogies of individuals and households in the
13th-20th centuries Tong Cheng County of Anhui, Shiue (2017) is the first scholar
to confirm that, since the 1600s, the fertility rates have shown a similar pattern to
those of Western populations in the latter part of the industrial revolution, recording
a substantial substitution of quantity by quality within the population. She finds
that households with a smaller number of male children had a significantly higher
chance of letting one of the children participate in the civil exam. However, Tong
Cheng was a county with a well-developed economy, especially in business and trade,
thus may not be the most representative one in Qing dynasty. This study focuses on
the northeastern region of China. The fertility controls for educational purposes in
this region, which was one of the most educationally underdeveloped areas (Liang,
2005), can imply that in other vast areas of China, where the Han-style schools were
far more spread and popular, the trade-o↵ may also exist and even emerge earlier.
In Northeast China, Han-style education began to develop in the late 17th century
as a consequence of the inflow of exiled intellectuals and literary talents into the
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northeast, and the adoption of the civil exam (keju). Then it rapidly spread and
became popularized since the mid-18th century (i.e., around 1760-1770) when the
number of Confucianism-oriented Academies (shuyuan) and private schools (sishu)
dramatically increased and thus the children from a broader spectrum of households
had a chance to access to education. Since then, an increase in the incentives to
control births in response to education goals has occurred in the northeastern region
among the households of all levels.
By investigating historical micro-data from the China Multi-Generational Panel
Dataset, Liaoning (CMGPD-LN), we confirm that fertility restrictions due to human
capital objectives were generated during the Qing era even in the underdeveloped
northeast China. A negative relationship between fertility and education does not
directly imply a rational choice of household; it may be unintended consequences
due to limited household resources or behaviors taking the number of children as
given. This concern is addressed by running regressions by household categories
(elite vs. non-elite households3) and birth cohorts relating to di↵erent periods (pre-
vs. post- mid-18th cohorts) in the process of a plebeianized education. The results
of this paper support a historical link between human capital and reproductive rate
for regular status households as a whole from the mid-18th to the end of the 19th
century, corresponding to the period when a large number of shuyuan and sishu was
established for people of common social classes in Liaoning.4 For men from the non-
elite households and born after the 1760s, one less brother leads to a 0.4% increase in
the probability of obtaining an education; however, the negative relationship between
reproduction of sons and human capital investment does not appear before, when
the number of schools failed to cope with children from non-elite households. While
among the elite households,the trade-o↵ appears for both baseline (males born in the
period of 1760-1880) and pre-baseline sample (men born before 1760 as pre-baseline
cohorts), and the size of the sibship e↵ect on education is always larger for those
households and equals 3.2% in our baseline. The conclusion does not alter when the
birth-order e↵ect is cleared out with a two-stage estimation.
3Elite households refers to the households in which either the father or the grandfather had an
administrative position or was educated, and the rest were non-elite households.
4This is not claiming that the resources of education were equally distributed across all social
categories, and in fact the elite households still had a strong privilege in receiving an education.
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In addition, this paper has a substantial advantage due to its dataset, enabling not
only the counting of siblings but also the matching of twins. We explore the twins at
last birth as the main instrument to control for unobservable determinants of fertility
and parental choice. Other factors are considered in our robustness checks, such as
household-level estimations, the inclusion of female siblings into the regressions, and
the exclusion of infanticide, techniques of contraception, and natural disasters which
may have influenced the sibship size unintentionally within a household.
Numerous studies of fertility-human capital trade-o↵ in China are based on con-
temporary populations, mostly exploiting China’s family planning policy and one-
child policy as natural experiments. Wang, Zhao, and Zhao (2017) examines system-
atically the labor market outcomes of China’s family planning policies, which limited
the number of children. Liang and Gibson (2018) find an adverse e↵ect of siblings
on human capital accumulations and discover a stronger negative influence on girls
than on boys, which reveals so-called “boy-preference” in Chinese society (Li, Yi,
and Zhang, 2011; Zhang, 2017). Though this strand of literature could not quanti-
tatively support for the transition occurred in pre-modern history, it enlightens our
choice of empirical strategies.
This paper contributes to the literature by showing empirical evidence for the his-
torical fertility transition from micro-level records collected in dynasty Qing and esti-
mating unbiased results. Among the literature regarding the human capital-fertility
relationships in history, aggregated data, which was firstly exploited, masks impor-
tant heterogeneity determining their relationships (Guinnane, 2011). Recent and
increasingly expanding literature employs more disaggregated information. Becker,
Cinnirella, and Woessmann (2010, 2012), for instance, use county-level data to show
that a quantity-quality tradeo↵ existed in 19th century Prussia. Scholars even ex-
plore individual data from genealogies and registers. Klemp and Weisdorf (2018)
explore a genealogy of English individuals living between the 16th and the 19th cen-
turies, and show that lower reproductive capacity exerted a positive influence on
the educational achievements of o↵spring. The individual-level data we employ can
also capture the essential individual and household characteristics in determining the
human capital-fertility link amidst the fertility transition.
Another contribution is we generalize the origins of fertility transitions, by shift-
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ing the focus from Europe to China. Generally, fertility decline has been associated
with changes in child mortality, public schooling, child labor or other factors (East-
erlin and Crimmins, 1985; Lee, 2003; Doepke, 2004). In contrast with Western de-
velopments during the period of interest, China experienced few socio-institutional
changes involving fertility controls, perhaps even fewer in the northeastern region.
Our findings emphasize that the characteristics to the Western experience were not
a critical factors; however, the educational returns and costs were necessary for the
quantity-quality trade-o↵ to occur in a pre-industrial society. Finally, the current
study not only challenges the traditional Malthusian model regarding ancient Chi-
nese fertility and enriches the existing literature on the Chinese moral, cultural,
institutional, and economic development, but it also deepens the understanding of
the relationship between historical experience and economic growth.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 briefly introduces the
historical background of northeastern education. Section 3.3 discusses the CMGPD-
LN dataset and the variables. After that, we introduce the empirical methods used
in the analysis in section 3.4. Section 3.5 presents the empirical results, as well as
the robustness checks. Section 3.6 concludes the paper.
3.2 Historical Background of Northeastern Edu-
cation during the Qing dynasty
The Jurchens were a federation of non-Chinese tribes living in the northeast
of China (modern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang). With a strong
military organization of all tribes, they conquered northern China and founded the
Jin dynasty (1115-1234). Their ethnic descendants, the Manchus established the
Qing dynasty, later conquered the Ming dynasty and became the ruler of entire
China between 1644 and 1911.
Before the Qing dynasty started to take over Inner China (i.e., China proper),
Hong Taiji, a tribal leader of Manchus from 1626 to 1636, had realized the importance
of education, had implemented regulation encouraging the elites’ participation in the
educational system and promoted Confucianism-oriented education. These e↵orts
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fostered the development of northeastern education until 1644. However, due to the
Qing dynasty’s dominion over China proper which started in 1644, a substantial
migration of educated people from the northeast to Inner China destroyed the base
of education in this region (Gao, 1996; Liang, 2005).
3.2.1 The Emergence of Elite Education in the late 17th
century
The Han-style education revived in northeast China after several decades due to
two factors. The first factor was that the exiled intellectuals and literary talents lived
and taught in this region. Though Han people’s entry to the northeastern region was
forbidden, the criminalized Han people were sent there by the Qing government for
exile; many of them were political prisoners or intellectuals who had surrendered
when the Qing army had attacked the Central Plains. These exiled people brought
advanced knowledge of Inner China to the northeastern area and eventually fostered
the development of this region as they were hired as teachers in local schools. Their
roles in the spread of Confucianism, advanced culture, and Han Chinese language,
made the natives regard them with the utmost respect: some highly-educated exiled
people even had a high social status similar to that of military generals. As part of
the development process of the northeastern education, the inflow of exiled people
has founded the supply base of educational talents (Gao, 1996).
The second factor was the civil exam and high returns to education (Shi, 1994).
To develop an e↵ective form of governance and to consolidate the empire, the Qing
dynasty adopted most of the institutions left from the Ming dynasty, including the
civil exam. China’s civil exam aimed to recruit talented citizens to govern the country
and had three levels: the prefectural exam, the provincial exam, and the jinshi exam
(Chen, Kung, and Ma, 2017). For students the first step was to pass the prefectural
exam; the successful candidates could become shengyuan and were eligible to take
the provincial exam. Only a few of them could pass this second exam and receive a
juren title. At last, those with a juren qualification had a chance to take the final
stage of the civil exam, which is also called the jinshi exam. Small parts of the juren
qualification holders could achieve jinshi qualifications and were then guaranteed a
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position in the upper levels of the government. These jinshi holders could become
wealthy due to their high income and high social status. For the citizens with
shengyuan or juren title, the return to education was not as high as for jinshi holders,
but their income was much higher than the average income level.5 Those who had
received an education, but had not passed the shengyuan test, had a greater chance
of finding a paid and non-physical job compared to illiterate citizens.6 The roles of
education were reinforced starting from the end of 17th century, when the Manchu
people lost their privilege in the civil examination and governmental job applications
(Shi, 1994; Zhang, 2004). Before 1687, Manchu people had a separated exam track
and thus a relatively high chance to become state o cials; therefore most of the
Manchu o cials were not required to have an equivalent educational level to that
of their Han Chinese colleagues. However, in 1687 the Manchu people started being
required to attend the same civil exam as the Han Chinese and to encounter direct
competition from these highly-educated citizens; as a result of the policy, Manchu
people had no more premiums during the application process for a governmental
position. Due to this deregulation, Confucianism and Han Chinese-type education
further expanded their influence among Manchu people as they directly determined
the likelihood of becoming a state o cial (Ren, 2007; Xu, 2010).
Although the education began to develop and the returns to schooling remained
high since the late 17th century, educational resources, such as schools, were so
limited that they inevitably allowed only the entrance of the children from elite
households, in which either father or grandfather was educated or had a governmen-
tal position. In the early period of the Qing Dynasty, the education in the Northeast
was dominated by government-run schools, i.e., formal schools owned by the govern-
ments (guanxue), including state, prefecture or county-run schools (fuxue, zhouxue
or xianxue), though the number of government-run schools was small with limited
scale, and was mainly concentrated in Shengjing, Jilin, Heilongjiang and Dongsan-
meng and aimed at preparing o cials for the local government. Their admission
5Many of them could still work in educational institutions, such as teaching in public or private
schools; meanwhile, they had the right to be exempt from taxation, and many of them received a
subsidy from the state.
6Their level of knowledge and ability to use words skillfully made them qualified to work as a
bookkeeper or a secretarial sta↵ member.
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procedure to their courses was strict and largely based on the administrative ranks
(pin) of the candidates’ father or grandfather; as a consequence, most of the admit-
ted students were aristocratic bureaucrats (Zhao, 1928), only a quite small part of
the students were plebeians with a qualification of shengyuan.
3.2.2 The Popularization of Northeastern Education since
the mid-18th Century
Given that the supply of the government-run schools could not meet the educa-
tional demands of the ordinary citizens, the Qing government o↵ered a considerable
subsidy to Confucian Academies (shuyuan) as a way to encourage their operation
and to satisfy the need for educational resources. However, the development of the
Academies subsidized by the governments was still restricted, from the early Qing
Dynasty to the eleventh year of Yongzheng era (1733). As documented by the “Chi-
nese Ancient Academy System,” - “Apart from several historically significant and
influential ones, most shuyuan were shut down because the government could not
provide enough funds for the functioning.” In the early years of Qianlong era, with
the support of the government, the shuyuan started to use the donations of urban
industrial and commercial Confucian scholars to restore and allocate a large num-
ber of their services. In the middle of the Qianlong period (since the 1760s), the
government also formulated stricter rules and regulations to ensure the rights of the
shuyuan to their industries. Through these e↵orts, the shuyuan were able to de-
velop and grow in both number and scales, and could be attributed to the limited
admissions in the state or county-run schools (Xie, 2012): among the 18 shuyuan in
Liaoning, 16 of them were established after the 1760s.
These formal schools were still insu ciently supplied, a large number of old-style
private schools (sishu) thus emerged to provide training. Under the influence of the
exiled intellectuals, the local scholars gradually grew up, and some people started
the apprenticeship in private schools as a profession during the Qianlong era (Sun,
2010). As a result, also since the second half of the 18th century, these sishu could be
found everywhere in Liaoning (Zhang, 2013). The objects of private education were
quite extensive: children from the age of 5 or 6 up to the age of 25 or 26 years old,
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regardless of their social background, had the opportunity to receive an education.
They actively supplement the insu ciency of formal government-run schools and
Confucian Academies, becoming the most important part of education in Northeast
China, especially to children from non-elite origins.
To conclude, the exiled Han intellectuals, the establishment of an equitable civil
exam fostered the birth of Han-style education in Northeast China, although the
schools were only designed and accessible for aristocratic elites. Later the increased
educational resources in this region, particularly the expansion of both private-fund
shuyuan and sishu starting in the mid-18th century, more precisely 1760-1770, even-
tually generated incentives for the regular status citizens to invest in the human
capital of their successors. We propose that high returns to education and the popu-
larization of education, and thus lower costs of education,7 were the keys generating
the quantity-quality trade-o↵ within the population based on the historical context
examined.
3.3 Data and Variables
3.3.1 Dataset
In this study, the data used comes from the China Multi-Generational Panel
Dataset-Liaoning (CMGPD-LN), a large-scale dataset which comprises triennial house-
hold register data covering the period of 1749-1909 and on individuals born between
1664 and 1909; it was set up by James Lee and Cameron Campbell, and its features
have been discussed in Lee and Campbell (1997) and Lee and Wang (2009). The
dataset contains 1.5 million records for approximately 260,000 people who lived in
nearly 700 villages in the Liaoning province of northeast China. The spatial distribu-
tion of the villages involved is mapped in Figure 3.1. Compared with other datasets
7The negative relationship between accessibility of formal training and costs of education can be
illustrated as follows: the tuition fees (shuxiu) in private schools (sishu) were decided by the supply
and the demand sides, i.e., fewer sishu, higher fees; and if a plebeian one would like to go to public
school, which enrolled students based on the classes of households, his father had to purchase a
title/position to fit the requirements. Both two cases suggest that when the educational resources
failed to meet the needs of non-elite households, the costs of education were high.
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of China before the 20th century, CMGPD-LN provides the accurate sociological
and demographical information required for this study, including important individ-
ual data on fertility and education, household factors such as basic information on
family members, and village-level characteristics.
Arrangement of the Dataset: from Longitudinal to Cross-sectional data
Given that the CMGPD-LN is a dataset collected specifically for Event History
Analysis (EHA), data on the participating individuals was repeatedly recorded ev-
ery three years. However, this paper only requires cross-sectional information on
each individual (i.e., one record per individual), since we aim at disentangling the
relationship among defining life decisions, such as human capital investments. To
do so, we consider the birth year of a subject instead of their age, and select cross-
sectional values at a certain point in the life of an individual as inputs; these are
therefore regarded as fixed values in the analysis. For instance, variables such as the
household size, the father’s social status, occupation, education, retirement status at
the time of his child’s birth, the average grain prices and village population size when
the child was of school-age (6-15 years old), along with some time-invariant factors
such as individual educational experience, number of surviving brothers, and birth
order, are all selected as main variables in the regression. By keeping and arranging
all the needed information for one single record (i.e., observation), we make sure that
each individual appears only once in our dataset.
Baseline Cohorts Figure 3.2 maps the pattern and timing of fertility controls in
the northeastern region, where the values on the y-axis report the average size of
surviving brothers for the birth cohorts 1680-1880.8 It is observed from the figure
that, although the reproductive rate had been in decline since the late 17th century, it
was maintained at a low yet stable level, which signals an onset of birth controls which
had taken place in these villages.9 This implies is that the people in the northeastern
8Since the registers omit boys who died in their infancy or early childhood and most of the
unmarried girls, by considering the production of surviving brothers, what we actually measure
and study is reproductive rate rather than fertility rate.
9We noticed that the fertility controls in Manchuria (Figure 3.2) took place around 150 years
before the transition occurred in Europe. We believe that all countries have di↵erent patterns of
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region had by then accepted the idea of a quantity-quality trade-o↵: people were more
willing to increase their investment in human capital by reducing their reproductive
rate. This timing coincides with the historical statement concerning the growth of
shuyuan and sishu in this region happened during 1760-1770. Hence we consider the
males born in the period of 1760-1880 as a baseline to examine the linkage between
fertility and education, and men born before 1760 as pre-baseline cohorts.10
Sample Limitations Since females in ancient China had neither political positions
nor jobs and the data recording unmarried females is limited, we restrict the data to
males who have survived childhood,11 and whose family linkages could be identified
so that their household conditions could be traced. The unique parental ID allows
not only for the matching of parental education and social status, but also for the
identification of twins. Individuals without a valid parental ID are excluded from
the sample. By merging several files into one single dataset, household information
(particularly household income from salaried positions, household size) and other
data, such as average grain prices and the logged population during an individual’s
schooling time, are linked to personal data. Those whose household ID and village
ID could not be traced were excluded from the study. Considering that there are
possible mistakes in data collection, we also exclude some missing variables and
observations with unreasonably extreme values.
These restrictions leave us with 19,490 records for 19,490 individuals who were
born between 1760 and 1880 and came from approximately 699 di↵erent villages.
fertility change and do not necessarily follow the same pattern. For instance, although people deem
that fertility transition in England happened in the nineteenth century, Cinnirella et al. (2017)
show that the sampled families adjusted the timing of their births in accordance with the economic
conditions as birth control in the three centuries that preceded historical fertility transition. During
the Qing Dynasty, the popularity of imperial examinations and the accessibility to education led to
changes in birth controls in some parts of ancient China since the mid-18th century. Besides, Shiue
(2017) also confirms our point of view.
10Consider that individuals may go to school during their 5-15, we transfer this to a birth-year
cuto↵ of around 1760. Using [1760-10, 1760+10] as cuto↵ between baseline and pre-baseline group
does not alter the conclusion.
11We restrict our analytical sample to those who have survived into adulthood and therefore had
exam opportunities to avoid detecting an artificial negative correlation between sibling number and
individual education driven by higher early mortality risks of those having more siblings.
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3.3.2 Variables
The subscript of the variable represents multiple variable dimensions: i, b, j, k
stand for individual i of birth cohort b, who lived in household j of village k.
The dependent variable Edui is a dummy indicating if an individual i has ever
passed one or more levels of the civil exam or was an o cial student (i.e., preparing
for shenyuan exam), which we use to measure the individual educational achievement
or his family’s investment in human capital accumulation.12 The main explanatory
variables include Sibi, the number of surviving brothers that each individual had,
which is a suitable proxy of sibship size.13 We generate this variable by sorting and
counting total surviving brothers of every traceable individual.
Moreover, the siblings who share the same parental ID and born in the same
month and year are considered as twins.14 The twin variable is generated based on
the all-male sample by excluding the females before the variable is defined, therefore
includes only male twins.15 We assign a dummy Twini equals one to the individual
belonging to the household with twins as the last birth.
Our set of covariates includes individual and cohort characteristics. BirthOrderi
indicates individual’s birth order, while Ethnici suggests if the individual was an eth-
nic minority (ethnic Manchu, Mongol or Korean) or not; BirthY earb approximates
the fixed e↵ects of birth cohort b, which take into account the secular trends and
patterns of education. Another birth cohort-specific variable is the average prices
12This information is obtained from the variables called EXAMINATION and
GUAN XUE SHENG (o cial students) in the dataset. As the introduction and background
sections suggest, there were several levels of education attained. However, the CMGPD-LN dataset
does not contain the information about the levels of education, we thus can not use di↵erent levels
of education instead of a 0/1 education dummy.
13Our paper does not count and include the female siblings in the baseline results due to the
omission of girls in the dataset.
14Considering the recording errors of the variable named BAZI MONTH (bazi birth month), we
checked each record of the individual birth information, excluding the siblings born in the same
month and year, but one (or both) of them has inconsistent BIRTHYEAR or BAZI MONTH. We
lost 70 pairs, but we thus make sure that all the remaining individuals in 545 twin-pairs have
consistent recorded BIRTHYEAR and BAZI MONTH.
15For the case that the male twin from a twin of opposite sexes left in the sample, we switch our
focus to the overall sample, record down their IDs, and exclude these 283 observations from the
male sample.
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of main grains during birth-cohort b’s school ages (between 6 and 15 years old in
this paper), denoted RicePriceb, and SoyPriceb. These prices are measured by taels
(liang) of silver per dan.
The parental and household-level covariates include: F low statusj (if the father
of household j belonged to a low status administrative population:16 1 if yes, 0
if no), F positionj (if the father held salaried o cial positions or titles, such as
soldiers, artisans and clerks: 1 if yes, 0 if no), F educationj (if the father had received
education: 1 if yes, 0 if no), F ptitlej (if the father held a purchased title: 1 if yes, 0 if
no), F retirej (if the father was retired: 1 if yes, 0 if not), F orderj (the father’s birth
order); as well as HH salaryj (household income from salaried positions), HH sizej
(household size). We consider the values at each individual’s birth for analysis.
A series of village-level control variables are considered, including Regionk the
birthplace dummies (North, Central, South-Central, South), Logpopbk (logged aver-
age population of village k at one’s school ages).
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics
In Table 3.1 the characteristics of the independent variables, as well as the
individual-, household- and village-level control variables are summarized. The data
shows that the average number of surviving brothers was 1.807. Around 2.5% in-
dividuals had a pair of twin brothers in the family. The average birth order in the
sample was 2.084, and 4% of the included individuals were ethnic minorities. Very
few fathers had a premium administrative status, with only 6.7% occupying an o -
cial position, and 1.4% having an academic degree. A summary of the other variables
is also included in Table 3.1.
Moreover, columns (2) and (3) of Table 3.1 report summary statistics by educated
status. Educated individuals had a smaller number of male siblings than not educated
ones, and the di↵erence in the number of male siblings of educated and non-educated
was around 0.39, consistent with the theory of quality-quantity trade-o↵. These were
also signs of heterogeneity of resource across cohorts: ethnic minorities had better
16This information is obtained from the variable in the codebook named POPULA-
TION CATEGORY, which identifies whether an individual belonged to a regular, specialized, or
low status administrative population.
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access to the education in the northeastern region; educated men tended to have
more educated and high-status fathers as well as more wealthier households. All
these factors are explicitly controlled for in the following regressions.
3.4 Empirical Methods
After deriving a simple theoretical framework in line with Galor and Moav (2002)
which predicts the rational choice between human capital and fertility based on the
relative returns and costs of education in Appendix C.1, we introduce the empirical
methods to test whether our data supports the theoretical predictions.
3.4.1 Baseline Model
Given that the outcome is a binary variable, we apply the logit model and the
linear probability model.17 The outcome of the equation describing the human capital
investment can be expressed as:
Edui =  0 +  1Sibi +  2Xib +  3Wj +  4Zk + ✏i (1)
where Edui regards as the probability that individual i was educated and had
formal degree; Sibi is the number of surviving brothers that individual i had, which
represented the reproductive rates; Xib is a vector of covariates including individual
features and cohort indicators; Wj contains parental specific factors and household
characteristics of household j where i lived. Zk further considers a series of village k
e↵ects; ✏i is an error term. Robust standard errors are clustered at the father level
to account for the fact that siblings born to the same father may be correlated.18
Considering the coe cient  1, as our Figure 3.3 below shows, larger sibship size
is associated with a lower likelihood of being educated, which is in line with the
17Though the linear approximation may be inconsistent with probabilities close to zero or one;
we still exploit linear regressions to ease the interpretation of the results. All results are robust
regardless of the choice of specifications. The magnitude of coe cients estimated by logit is usually
slightly larger than those by linear models.
18Using the standard errors based on clustering at other levels, such as mother ID, household ID
does not alter the results.
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findings of the literature.
3.4.2 Opportunity Costs of Education
Though we consider a comparison between baseline cohorts and pre-baseline co-
horts inferred from the historical literature, we have neither a long enough across-
dynastic cohorts series to show changes in the quantity-quality relationship in a
long run nor precise information on yearly tuition fees and earnings, thus we cannot
estimate how the quantity-quality relationship alters as in response to an unitary
change in the educational returns and costs. Besides, some types of schools were
government-or-society-subsidized, it thus seemed the improvement of quality would
not crowd out the quantity. In light of these subsidies, would we expect to find a
trade-o↵?
To solve these two problems, we take care of the opportunity costs (i.e. loss of
labour income) associated with becoming a student. The real costs of human capital
investments were not only the direct educational costs, such as tuition fees,19 but
also the indirect costs, such as opportunity costs, namely the earnings that were lost
by choosing to receive an education instead of working during one’s childhood. Pre-
industrial northeast China was an agricultural society, the majority of households
in this region made a living on farming,20 therefore, the loss of labour income was
mostly associated with the loss of agricultural outputs. The CMGPD-LN contains
yearly information of main grain price in this region, which o↵ers enough temporal
variations and allows us to measure the opportunity costs of education by using the
average grain prices during birth cohort b’s school-age period (age 6-15 years) as a
proxy and to examine how it changes quantity-quality relationship.
The profits gained from farming can reliably approximate the opportunity costs
of education among farm households because the children (specifically for males)
in agricultural households usually were required to be involved in farming activities
during their entire childhood, while individuals pursuing education participated less
in farming activities; some of them did not need to take such physical labor because
19In government-or-society-subsidized schools, these fees were almost equal to zero.
20In our sample, 83% of the households were pure farm households.
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their parents hoped them to concentrate on their studies. We collect information on
annual variations in prices of two main grains (rice and soy) and restrict the sample
to men from farm households. The model with variations in the opportunity costs
of education during one’s childhood can be written as follows:
Edui = ↵0 + ↵1Sibi + ↵2Priceb + ↵3Priceb ⇥ Sibi + ↵4Xi + ↵5Wj + ↵6Zk + ei (2)
Where ↵2 captures an exogenous direct e↵ect of grain prices on the probability of
receiving education.21 The interaction term captures the change in the child quantity-
quality relationship when the opportunity costs vary. It means that, the marginal
impact of the sibship size on the likelihood of receiving the education, is associated
with grain prices. We expect when the opportunity costs were high (i.e., high grain
prices), by contracting the sibship size, the human investment will increase less when
compared to the baseline value; while as a consequence of a negative shock on the
main grain prices (i.e., lower opportunity costs), the quantity-quality relationship
should be statistically stronger among agricultural households.22
3.4.3 Netting out the Birth-order E↵ects
There are still two potential interpretations behind households’ intended behav-
iors: first, in order to increase average education, one had to cut down the number
of children that could be raised within certain budget constraints; second, higher
educational attainment was typically associated with lower birth order, so constrain-
ing sibship sizes increased average education. Previous empirical studies ignore that
sibship size and birth order are jointly determined, i.e., a household cannot change
the family size, holding the average birth orders within the family constant. Partic-
ularly, if parents have a predisposition to favor some birth orders, the coe cient on
sibship size in a regression of human capital investment on birth order and sibship
21The coe cient on grain price in the regression could be interpreted as the overall e↵ect of price
shock on education, including both substitution e↵ect and income e↵ect: the sign of overall e↵ect
indicates which e↵ect dominates another.
22Our expectation is supported by the theoretical model in Appendix C.1
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size provides a biased estimate of the quantity-quality trade-o↵ (Bagger, Birchenall,
and Mansour, 2013).
The two-steps empirical strategy from Bagger et al. (2013) resolves the issue.
In the first step, controlling for family fixed e↵ects (i.e., father fixed e↵ects), birth-
order e↵ects are estimated. In the second step, the ultimate family size e↵ect, is
captured by “netting out” the estimated birth-order e↵ect from the educational out-
come ˆNEi = Edui  
PQ
q=1  ̂1qBirthOrderijq.
23 Under this strategy, we get a clear
impact of family size on average children’s quality:
Edui =  0 +
QX
q=1











4Zk + vi (3.2)
Where uj represents household fixed e↵ects. Since the dependent variable in the
second stage is generated by a regression, standard errors are corrected by boot-
strapping across both stages. With the two-stage model, we are assessing the e↵ect
of sibship size on firstborns by looking at the outcomes of firstborns in households
of di↵erent size, i.e., it is not feasible to look at the outcome of fifth-borns when the
sibship size changes from three to four, as fifth born children are only observed in
larger families.
3.4.4 Instrumental Variable
The coe cients for the sibship size as estimated by the OLS are likely to be bi-
ased even after controlling for a series of observable factors, as the fertility rates may
be endogenous with respect to education. The likelihood of sending some children
to school is also related to one’s fertility choices. We thus employ an instrumental
variable methodology and explore an exogenous fertility-determinant variable gen-
erated by the birth of twins. The use of twins as an instrument for estimating
sibship size is pioneered by Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980a), and has been applied
by Bronars and Grogger (1994), and Angrist and Evans (1998), who use twin births
23The subscript q indicates the birth order q=1,..Q where Q is the maximum number of children.
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as an instrumental variable for both male and female twins. Twin births have also
been previously investigated in attempts to empirically support the Becker and Lewis
(1973) quantity-quality model that predicts a negative impact of sibship size on a
child’s present-day outcomes (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1980b; Black and Salvanes,
2005; Caceres and Delpiano, 2006; Angrist, Lavy, and Schlosser, 2010).
Our IV strategy explicitly uses the occurrence of twins at last birth to instrument
for sibship size. Using twins at last birth ensures that desired fertility is, on average,
the same for parents with singletons and for parents with a twin birth. A key
concern raised throughout the literature lies on the validity of the instrument. For
our identifications to be valid, the instrument should satisfy the following three
conditions: relevance, homogeneity, and the exclusion restriction assumption.
The first condition is satisfied, given that the main advantage of using twin births
is that they provide an unexpected shock to fertility. Therefore, it is a particularly
relevant instrument, as it increases the number of children by nearly one.
The occurrence of twins is exogenous to other personal or parental characteris-
tics, the correlations among which could be rejected at a 10% significance level; the
few existing exceptions, such as an household size, become important controls in the
regression model. The IV approach requires the instrument to be random and con-
ditional on observable covariates. This assumption can be violated if parents choose
not to give birth to twins through medical treatments or abortions. These issues
are unlikely to arise in our case: ancient China had no such technologies, therefore
the sex of one’s child, the propensity for twin births, and the birth order were all
unpredictable. A possible concern to be addressed here is that of post-natal fertil-
ity controls. However, infanticide mostly a↵ected girls and they have already been
excluded from the sample.
In order for our instrument to be valid, it must also satisfy the exclusion restriction
assumption related to the e↵ect of having a twin brother on the probability of receiv-
ing an education. Using twin birth at last birth ensures that the family size changes
without also changing the birth orders of the non-twin children.24 Meanwhile, in
the education-focused equation, we include variables that act as confounding factors
and are a↵ected by this fertility shock while having a direct e↵ect on an individual’s
24While twins had the same birth order in the registers
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human capital formation, such as the household size.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Sibship Size E↵ects
First, we examine the sibship size e↵ect. We begin with the logit estimates as
our benchmark results in Table 3.2, where the dependent variable is the probability
of being educated Edui. Column (1) of Table 3.2 reports the results for the logit
model including solely sibship size. The significant coe cient indicates that, without
controlling for any heterogeneity, on average one less male sibling is correlated with
a 1.2% increase in the likelihood of human capital formation. Though the e↵ect
seems small in absolute value, it roughly represents a large raise in human capital
accumulations at the sample average. Conditional on individual characteristics and
cohort indicators, we estimate the impact of brother size on an individual’s education,
as shown in column (2). Regression in column (3) further includes parental and
household-level elements, which account for the potential endogeneity of fertility
choice due to parental preferences and family background. In column (4), we estimate
the full specification of the regression by adding the village population size, and the
region fixed e↵ects, which account for some unobservable factors such as regional
development and other demographic elements. The results are very similar, showing
that one less brother raises the probability of being educated by 0.86% for the sample
as a whole, a 15% (0.86/5.74=0.15) increase when we evaluate at the mean of the
outcome variable.
After reporting the estimate from a linear full-specification in column (1) of Table
3.3, whose absolute value is slightly smaller than the one obtained from the logit
model, we divide individuals into several subsamples. The first comparison is between
the elite and non-elite households in the baseline sample. In columns (2) and (3),
the coe cients for the sibship size are significant in both regression. As expected,
the size of the coe cient of interest is larger in column (3), and exhibits that one
less male sibling for those individuals from elite households, who were able to acquire
human capital easier, is associated with a greater chance of receiving an education
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of 3.2%. In columns (4)-(7), we perform the same regression on pre-1760 cohorts
as placebo.25 From the historical documentation in section 3.2, during when the
period they were raised, there were not su cient Han Chinese-type shuyuan or sishu
to meet their needs, resulting in a too high threshold to receive education. The
fertility control for the human capital purpose was thus not popular among the pre-
baseline sample as a whole. While when we restrict the sample to the children from
elite households, the coe cient of sibship size becomes significant and equals -0.016.
This result indicates that since education was profitable because of the adoption of
civil exam, the households who had privilege in sending their children to guanxue,
suppressed births to invest in education.
3.5.2 Opportunity Costs of Education
We then analyze the quantity-quality trade-o↵ separately for those individuals
from full-time farm households, where all the elder household members of the in-
dividual made their own clothing, tools, used farming to grow their own food and
maintained a self-su cient living, from those men in salaried household, where at
least one elder household member earned salaries specified in archival documents for
the positions or titles recorded in the register such as head of the household groups,
artisan, clerks, and soldiers, etc. In column (1) of Table 3.4, the coe cient of inter-
est for the farming households is significant but much closer to zero, relative to that
of salaried household in column (4), whose probability of human capital investment
raises by 2.7% with a unit decrease in sibling size, constituting evidence for a much
more strengthened quantity-quality trade-o↵ for the households with salaries. Mean-
while we expect the mechanism (i.e., both direct and indirect e↵ect) of the average
grain prices during one’s six- to fifteen-year-old, defined as opportunity costs of going
25We choose individuals born between 1700 and 1760 as pre-baseline sample. The CMGPD-LN
registers started from 1749, with limited coverage at the beginning. The calculated sibship size for
those born in 1700-1760 may thus biased toward large and wealthy families with old fathers and
adult brothers who managed to survive to 1749. To deal with this selection problem, we further
restrict the pre-baseline sample to individuals born between 1730 and 1760, so that even the eldest
cohorts just entered their adulthood in the first register, and thus just qualified to be compared with
other males who had been alive until their adulthood in the regressions (see “Sample Limitations”
of section 3.3.1)
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to school, work only for farm households; and the coe cient of grain (rice) price,
which suggests the total e↵ect of our setting of educational costs, is only significant
for farm households.
Columns (2) and (3) report that the opportunity costs played a role in deter-
mining the level of human capital accumulation and the quantity-quality correlation
among households living on farming activities, no matter what kinds of grain con-
sidered. The coe cients of the interaction terms indicate the di↵erence in education
between one more and one less brother is shortened, capturing a negative e↵ect of
opportunity costs on the quality-quantity relationship explored. The results in these
columns confirm the importance of opportunity costs on receiving an education as
well as on the e↵ect of reproductive rates for the households living on farming activ-
ities, and in general quality elasticity is substantially more amplified. In columns (5)
and (6), we find that the direct and indirect e↵ects of opportunity costs of education
on the optimal educational decision are statistically zero for the households who live
on the salary from positions, rather than agricultural activities. Individuals from
this type of households were likely not required to work on land when they were
at their school-age, thus the grain price is not their opportunity costs of education.
Therefore, we do not observe any e↵ect.
3.5.3 Two-step Estimation Results
Column (1) of Table 3.5 shows estimate with a linear specification of birth order,
while column (2) allows for a more flexible specification by putting specific birth
order indicators instead. The within-family estimates show that an individual with
one additional unit of birth rank is 1.4% less likely to be educated, and this e↵ect is
highly significant. When the first-borns are used as the reference group, the second-
born, third-born, fourth-born children, and the children with a higher birth rank
than that are less and less likely to receive education. These estimates are negative
and highly significant.
Columns (3)-(8) report the results in the second step of our two-step estimation.
When we apply the linear regression of “netted education”, which nets out the birth-
order e↵ect estimated in the first step, we find the coe cients of the sibship size
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remain highly significant but with a smaller magnitude of 0.5%, as reported in column
(3).
When we apply the same regression to the low-status or special duty population
subpopulations (i.e., Booi Aha26), who according to historical documentation, did
not have any chance or just a teeny tiny chance to take civil exams. As expected, the
result reject a quantity-quality trade-o↵ among these households, with an e↵ect of
sibship size close to zero as shown in column (4). Other population apart from this
is considered as regular population, which is further divided into elite and non-elite
households. Results from columns (5)-(7) are similar as our previous findings, while
with smaller magnitudes.
3.5.4 Instrumented Results
As outlined above, the coe cients of sibship size estimated with the OLS are
upwardly biased because of the endogeneity problem. Thus, we use an IV approach
and explore twins at last birth as a plausible instrument. Table 3.6 presents the
two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimate after implementing a linear specification
in both stages. In columns (1) and (2), without controlling for any covariate, we
simply instrument the sibship size with the incidence of twins at last birth, while
in columns (3) and (4) we use the full specification of the model. Throughout all
these specifications, the results of the first stage show a statistically significant and
positive correlation between twins and sibship size. In particular, any incidence of
twins at last birth increases the number of siblings by 70-92%.
According to the main results in second stage, the coe cients for instrumented
sibship size are always negative and significant. We find that the OLS estimates
are biased upwards, which fits our expectations. We can, therefore, draw strong
conclusions for our study, as the calculated F-statistics of our instrument is greater
than 10. Estimate of the full specification from the linear model in column (3)
suggests that one less brother leads to a 2% increase in the likelihood of receiving
formal schooling. In column (4), when the “netted education” is the outcome variable
26More introduction and regression results on the low-status population is addressed in Appendix
C.2
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instead of the education dummy, the size of e↵ect on the human capital investment
drops to 1.7%, but remain huge with respect to outcome mean and significant.
3.5.5 Robustness Checks
Inclusion of Female Siblings Although females were excluded on the ground that
they were largely omitted from the household registers and typically not educated at
that time, surviving girls would still carry some weight in the household budget.27
We thus employ a sensitivity check where the number of female siblings in the same
household are accounted for in addition to male siblings.
The analysis in Table 3.7 further includes the gender composition of the siblings
in the covariates. We apply the previous exercises including two-step estimation (in
column (2)), IV estimation (in column (3)), regressions by administrative classes
(low-status population in column (4), comparison between elites and non-elites in
columns (5) and (6)) and cohorts (baseline vs. pre-baseline cohorts in columns (1)
and (7)). The results do not alter; and all estimates move upwards when the number
of female siblings is taken into account.
Household-level estimation In this part, the education equation is estimated
with household as the unit of analysis instead of the child, in order to check the
robustness of the baseline findings by changing the estimation unit and sample.
Focusing on the ratio of educated children as a function of total fertility in the
household, it is not required to include variables at individual or cohort dimension,
such as birth-order e↵ects. We estimate the following specification:
RatioEducatedj = ⇣0 + ⇣1Childj + ⇣2Wj + ⇣3Zk + ⌫j (4)
Where the outcome is the ratio of educated children in the household j and the
explanatory variable is Childj, i.e., the number of children, of this household. The
coe cient ⇣1 approximates the change in the ratio correlated with a unitary increase
in the total number of children. Likewise, Wj includes household level characteristics
27For instance, a household could be huge if it consisted of two males and eight females; the study
would make this like a relatively small family with a sibship size equal to two rather than ten.
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such as the household income from salaried positions, household size, and parental
characteristics such as the father’s position, title, etc. And Zk the village level
characteristics, including logged population and regional dummies; ⌫j is an error
term. This model is estimated with both OLS and IV.
Results are shown in Table 3.8. OLS and IV estimates in columns (1)-(2) support
that as a consequence of a unitary increase in the number of children, the ratio on
average decreases about 1.5-2% for the full sample. Other results on di↵erent sub-
samples in columns (3)-(7) show a similar pattern to Tables 3.3 and 3.5 regardless
of the approach explored, indicating the deliberate fertility control for human cap-
ital objectives was not homogenous to all households and start among the general
population from the end of 18th century.
3.5.6 Alternative Explanations of Fertility Declines
In this part, we extensively rule out other possible influential factors, such as
natural disasters, infanticide, and improved techniques of contraception, which may
have influenced the sibship size unintentionally within a household.
Natural Disasters During Qing dynasty, natural disaster area concentrated on
Hebei and Shandong (including flooding, windstorm, and drought). The northeast-
ern region has rarely been a disaster-a↵ected area due to its altitude and land fertil-
ity. According to the Qing lichao shilu (Record of the Qing Dynasty), a large-scale
drought and hunger influenced many regions in Inner China in 1876, especially the
North China Plain. Although we find no evidence that this drought also a↵ected the
northeastern region, we exclude the households with any child born after 1876 and
find no substantial changes in our estimation after the exclusion.
Infanticide Lee and Campbell (1997) point out that in the northeastern region
a substantial increase in food prices raised the potential threat of hunger, which in
turn increased the likelihood to commit infanticide in low-income households. There
are two reasons why infanticide does not a↵ect our conclusion. First, the majority
of our observations were male and thus una↵ected by infanticide, given that this
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practice had no impact on the male population in China (Cao and Chen, 2002). Sec-
ond, the rate of infanticide could be overestimated because the northeastern farmers
considered perinatal mortality to be a type of infanticide and thus misreported it.
Contraception Started during the Ming dynasty, the technology of contraception
existed in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. However, this sort of technique was unreliable
and unsuccessful in contraception. Cao and Chen (2003) highlight that the method
of contraception plays no importance in fertility before the 20th century. As this
technique never prevailed in the northeastern region during the period studied, the
considerable reduction in Liaoning’s male population could not be attributed to the
contraception when facing limited household resources.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical support for one of the central mechanisms of the
unified growth theories which attempt to explain demographic transitions as well as
economic growth over a long period of time (Galor, 2011; 2012). These theories typi-
cally are applied to ascribe the past fertility decline in Western Europe to the raising
needs for education stimulated by the process of industrialization, and indicate that
technological progress is the element which has encouraged both a demographic and
a historical transition from Malthusian stagnation to modern growth.
In China, there was evidence of fertility control motivated by educational objec-
tives starting as early as the 17th century in some highly-populated and developed
counties (Shiue, 2017). This paper focuses on one other region in China, the north-
eastern region. Using quantitative and rigorously gathered evidence, we find evidence
that the quantity-quality relationship held for a large part of China’s population since
the 18th century; as such, a smaller sibship size would lead to a higher likelihood
of investing in human capital accumulations. This occurred along with increased
returns on investments in education (i.e., more salaried positions) and greater ac-
cessibility to education (i.e., increased Han-style schools), providing incentives for
people to reduce their family size and focus on human capital objectives.
We attempt to rule out other two interpretations of this negative linkage other
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than rational behaviors in restricting fertility: unintended consequences due to lim-
ited household resources; and birth-order e↵ects, that a constrained sibship size
limited the individual with lower birth-order, therefore, increased the average educa-
tion. The historical background as well as the heterogeneity across subpopulations
strongly support the deliberate fertility restriction for incentives to receive educa-
tion; while the birth-order e↵ects are netted out by a two-step estimation. When IV
procedures were employed and we instrument the sibship size by using twins at the
last birth, the instrumented results also suggest that an additional sibling leads to
a decrease in the probability of receiving education. All results remain robust when
we change the estimation unit and sample.
To conclude, the trade-o↵ between fertility and education was not necessarily the
direct consequence of industrialization, which had not yet occurred in the region, but
was caused by rational behaviors within households in response to regional develop-
ment in education. Further studies on other economies within and outside of China
are required to determine whether these findings can be generalized. These implica-
tions could help social scientists to better understand specific historical behaviors,
but also lend support to growth patterns in ancient China.
Most literature on how quantity-quality relationship holds in third-world devel-
oping countries pays attention to the educational outcome of a birth control policy.
While from our policy point of view, it is necessary to understand the extent to
which a policy formulated to popularize education, such as the introduction of pub-
lic education system (Li, Zhang, Zhu, 2008), the enrollment expansion of schools and
universities (Duraisamy et al., 1999), etc., incentivizes the household’s internal fer-
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Figure 3.1: Located CMGPD-LN villages. Source: Lee et al. (2010)
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Figure 3.2: Fertility Transitions
124
Figure 3.3: Fertility-Education Trade-o↵
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All Non-educated Educated Di↵erence
Explanatory & Instrumental Variables
Sibship size 1.807 1.830 1.439 0.390***
(1.437) (1.448) (1.182)
Twins in family 0.0247 0.0255 0.0116 0.0139***
(0.155) (0.158) (0.107)
Individual level
Birth order 2.084 2.084 2.084 -0.000
(1.373) (1.378) (1.409)
Ethnic minority 0.0419 0.0396 0.0804 -0.0408***
(0.200) (0.195) (0.272)
Cohort level
Birth year 1833.6 1834.4 1820.4 14.02***
(36.67) (36.76) (32.51)
Rice price 1.831 1.834 1.765 0.0708***
(0.417) (0.411) (0.507)
Soy price 0.606 0.608 0.587 0.0205***
(0.131) (0.130) (0.154)
Household level
Father’s low status 0.0692 0.0719 0.0241 0.0478***
(0.254) (0.258) (0.153)
Father’s position 0.0669 0.0499 0.345 -0.295***
(0.250) (0.218) (0.475)
Father’s education 0.0140 0.0099 0.0813 -0.0709***
(0.118) (0.099) (0.273)
Father’s purchased title 0.0074 0.0049 0.0482 -0.0433***
(0.0856) (0.0698) (0.214)
Father is retired 0.0078 0.0079 0.0054 0.0025
(0.0877) (0.0885) (0.0730)
Father’s birth order 2.131 2.121 2.303 -0.182***
(1.542) (1.526) (1.777)
Household salary 6.338 4.627 34.40 -29.78***
(26.04) (22.70) (50.15)
Household size 20.48 20.66 17.51 3.143***
(14.39) (14.50) (12.13)
Village level
Logpop 5.837 5.820 6.121 -0.301***
(1.305) (1.301) (1.346)
#obs. 19,490 18,370 1,120
1 Column 4 report raw di↵erences in means across cohort.
2 The average grain prices have a di↵erent number of observations: 18,918.
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
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Education (1=Yes; 0=No)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sibship size -0.220*** -0.247*** -0.201*** -0.202***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Birth order 0.066** -0.109*** -0.123***
(0.028) (0.031) (0.031)
Ethnic 0.568*** 0.084 0.082
(0.126) (0.149) (0.145)
Father’s low status -1.025*** -0.923***
(0.225) (0.220)
Father’s position 1.766*** 1.575***
(0.195) (0.162)
Father’s education 0.972*** 1.111***
(0.295) (0.302)
Father’s purchased title 1.237*** 1.645***
(0.372) (0.381)
Father is retired -0.778 -0.729
(0.548) (0.528)
Father’s birth order 0.011 -0.021
(0.027) (0.027)
Household salary 0.019*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.004)
Household size -0.039*** -0.034***
(0.006) (0.006)
Village population (logged) 0.096***
(0.031)
Marginal E↵ects
Sibship size -0.0119*** -0.0128*** -0.0088*** -0.0086***
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0014)
Birth cohort FE No Yes Yes Yes
Region FE No No No Yes
N 19490 19490 19490 19490
1 Coe cients are estimated from the logit model.
2 Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the father level.
Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table 3.2: Sibship Size E↵ects
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Education (1=Yes; 0=No)
Baseline sample Pre-baseline sample
All sample Elite Non-elite 1700-1760 1730-1760 Elite Non-elite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sibship size -0.0076*** -0.0319*** -0.0042*** 0.0021 0.0039 -0.0165* 0.0038
(0.0013) (0.0061) (0.0011) (0.0026) (0.0031) (0.0098) (0.0025)
Birth order -0.0059*** -0.0140*** -0.0041*** -0.0048* -0.0064* -0.0291** -0.0009
(0.0014) (0.0045) (0.0013) (0.0028) (0.0033) (0.0117) (0.0027)
Ethnic 0.0128 0.0088 0.0132 0.0040 0.0038 -0.0081 0.0042
(0.0102) (0.0314) (0.0093) (0.0088) (0.0095) (0.0501) (0.0079)
Father’s low status -0.0278*** -0.0965** -0.0212*** 0.0192 0.0200 0.0000 0.0212
(0.0046) (0.0397) (0.0045) (0.0198) (0.0199) (.) (0.0199)
Father’s position 0.1697*** 0.1336*** 0.0000 0.0246 0.0307 0.1154*** 0.0000
(0.0170) (0.0184) (.) (0.0196) (0.0206) (0.0438) (.)
Father’s education 0.1121*** 0.1072*** 0.0000 0.2294 0.2410 0.3558** 0.0000
(0.0355) (0.0362) (.) (0.1603) (0.1771) (0.1778) (.)
Father’s purchased title 0.1398*** 0.1465*** 0.0000 0.3320** 0.3280** 0.2612 0.0000
(0.0512) (0.0514) (.) (0.1466) (0.1564) (0.1596) (.)
Father is retired -0.0333* -0.1718 -0.0118 0.0043 -0.0014 -0.0857 0.0133*
(0.0187) (0.1060) (0.0150) (0.0090) (0.0109) (0.0529) (0.0080)
Father’s birth order -0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0025** -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0180 0.0011
(0.0013) (0.0042) (0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0023) (0.0152) (0.0019)
Household salary 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0013*** 0.0030*** 0.0029*** 0.0033*** 0.0030***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004)
Household size -0.0010*** -0.0044*** -0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0011 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0006) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0011) (0.0001)
Village population (logged) 0.0080*** 0.0244*** 0.0041*** -0.0013 -0.0017 0.0141 -0.0021*
(0.0014) (0.0072) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0088) (0.0012)
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 19490 2438 17052 6348 4982 478 5870
Mean DV (%) 5.75 21.29 3.52 3.5 3.75 17.36 2.37
1 The baseline sample means males born in the period of 1760-1880 and pre-baseline sample means men born between 1700 and 1760.
2 Coe cients are estimated from the linear probability model.
3 Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the father level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table 3.3: Sibship Size E↵ects by Subsamples
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Education (1=Yes; 0=No)
Farm households Salaried households
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Siblings -0.0043*** -0.0170*** -0.0167*** -0.0275*** -0.0119 -0.0164
(0.0009) (0.0045) (0.0047) (0.0060) (0.0204) (0.0239)
Rice price -0.0214*** -0.0339*** 0.0122 0.0282
(0.0040) (0.0065) (0.0181) (0.0289)
Siblings ⇥ Rice price 0.0070*** -0.0086
(0.0023) (0.0110)
Soy price -0.1094*** 0.0579
(0.0208) (0.0955)
Siblings ⇥ Soy price 0.0205*** -0.0184
(0.0073) (0.0381)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 16231 16231 16231 2687 2687 2687
1 Coe cients are estimated from the linear probability model. The marginal e↵ect of siblings on education is a function of
grain prices; this function we assume to be linear.
2 Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the father level. Significant at * 10%, **
5%, *** 1%.
3 Controls include birth order, ethnicity, father’s low status, position, education, purchased title, retirement status and
birth order, household salary, household size, and village population. These regressions do not contain cohort indicators;
they absorb entirely the e↵ect of opportunity costs which vary only across cohort.
Table 3.4: Opportunity Cost of Education: Grain Prices and Farming Households
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First step Second step
Education (1=Yes; 0=No) Netted Education (Edui  
PQ
q=1 ˆ 1qBirthOrderijq)
All Low status Regular status
All regular Elite Non-elite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sibship size -0.0049*** 0.0014 -0.0054*** -0.0330*** -0.0012*











Father fixed e↵ects Yes Yes - - - - -
Controls - - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Birth cohort FE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE - - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 19490 19490 19490 1348 18142 2438 15761
1 Coe cients are estimated from the linear probability model.
2 Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the father level. Significant at * 10%,
** 5%, *** 1%.
3 Covariates include ethnic minority, father’s low status, position, education, purchased title, retirement, age at child’s
birth, household salary, household size, and logged village population.
Table 3.5: Birth-order E↵ects
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
First Stage Without covariates With all covariates
Twin births 0.922*** 0.698***
(0.124) (0.093)
F statistics 55.55 18.69
Second Stage Education (1=Yes; 0=No) Netted educ Education (1=Yes; 0=No) Netted educ
Siblings -0.0338*** -0.0228** -0.0221** -0.0174*
(0.0103) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0104)




Father’s low status -0.0288*** -0.0282***
(0.0046) (0.0045)
Father’s position 0.1687*** 0.1665***
(0.0172) (0.0172)
Father’s education 0.1081*** 0.1082***
(0.0357) (0.0358)
Father’s purchased title 0.1433*** 0.1426***
(0.0516) (0.0515)
Father is retired -0.0300 -0.0295
(0.0189) (0.0188)
Father’s birth order -0.0024 -0.0023
(0.0015) (0.0015)
Household salary 0.0014*** 0.0015***
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Household size -0.0009*** -0.0008***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Village population (logged) 0.0083*** 0.0082***
(0.0014) (0.0014)
N 19490 19490 19490 19490
1 Coe cients in first stage are estimated by OLS; coe cients in second stage are estimated from the linear probability
model.
2 Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the father level. Significant at * 10%,
** 5%, *** 1%.
Table 3.6: Instrumented Results
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All sample Low status Regular status Pre-baseline sample
OLS Two-step est. IV Elite Non-elite All sample Elite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Sibship size -0.0054*** -0.0031*** -0.0197* -0.0004 -0.0203*** -0.0030*** 0.0028 -0.0151*
(female siblings included) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0102) (0.0035) (0.0055) (0.0011) (0.0026) (0.0085)
Birth cohort FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 19490 19490 19490 1348 2438 15761 6348 478
1 Coe cients are estimated from the linear probability model.
2 Besides the covariates indicated above, we further add the gender composition in this analysis.
3 Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the father level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table 3.7: Robustness Checks: Inclusion of Female Siblings
All sample Low status Regular status Pre-period
OLS IV Elite Non-elite All Elite
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of children -0.0198*** -0.0153* -0.0037 -0.0490*** -0.0146*** 0.0007 -0.0311***
(0.0021) (0.0088) (0.0053) (0.0101) (0.0019) (0.0021) (0.0096)
Household charac. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10243 10243 715 1260 8268 5111 399
1 Robust standard errors are reported between parentheses and are clustered at the household level. Significant at * 10%, ** 5%,
*** 1%.
2 In this table, the baseline period is set to be 1780-1880 instead of 1760-1880 as before, since for household sample, we use survey
year instead of birth year.
Table 3.8: Robustness Checks: Household-level estimation
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C.1: Theoretical Predictions
We consider a standard household utility maximization framework (Galor and
Moav, 2002; Shiue, 2017), that the utility of household depends on the consumption
level, the number of children, more specific, the number of surviving sons, and the
education level of those sons. To examine the trade-o↵ between fertility choice and
education, we maximize a log-linear utility function of a given household:
U(c, q, h) = (1   ) ln c+  (ln q +   lnh)
s.t. c+ pqq + phqh  Y
c   c̃
where the parameters 0 <   < 1 and 0 <   < 1 indicates the substitution
e↵ects among c, q and h. All income is spent on either consumption at level c,
raising a certain number q of children or human capital investment h measured by
the proportion of educated sons over total sons. Let the relative price of household
consumption be 1, pq the relative price of household’s spending in raising a child,
and ph the relative price of the household’s expenditures required for increasing one
quality-adjusted child. In this paper, ph includes the opportunity cost of education,
such as profits that the sons would have gained from labor work if they were not
working for a degree.
The condition c   c̃ indicates a certain consumption level to maintain basic
livings. Y denotes the exogenously given household income. The optimal fertility










Assumption A: Equations (A1) suggests a quantity-quality trade-o↵ from @h⇤
@q⇤ <
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0. A given increase in the optimal fertility q⇤ leads to a drop in the ratio of educated
kids by decreasing human capital investments. Not surprisingly, that quality and
quantity of children are substitutive under a given budget constraint.
Assumption B: Then we allow an increase in the relative returns to education
and/or a decrease in the direct or indirect costs of education, which leads to a
lower ph, denoted p0h. Comparing the ratios of educated sons concerning the fertility




@q⇤ < 0 from equation (A1),
which implies a greater trade-o↵. The increase in the net returns on human capital
formation will increase the optimal level of human capital investment, as equation
(A2) suggests, and thus leads to a lower fertility rate.
C.2. Sub-population: Booi Aha
In CMGPD-LN, the low-status sub-population, called Booi Aha in Manchu, refers
to hereditarily servile people. Booi Aha mainly came from the enslaved Chinese dur-
ing wartime, criminalized Manchu people (or people from the Eight Banner military
system) and their family. In the early Qing era, Booi Aha could be regarded as a
slave of their benefactor, so that no freedom of movement, marriage, and working
was given to them and their descendant. Given that this hereditary system was per-
ilously blocking social mobility, Qianlong Emperor reformed the Booi Aha’s system
after 1736: Booi Aha’s political status was improved to a large extent. Booi Aha-
Manchu people’s marriage was legalized and allowed to participate in the civil exam
or to become an o cial (Ren, 2003). CMGPD-LN claims that Booi Aha was totally
prevented from attending in the civil exam, but it is contrary to this evidence.
However, this does not mean the studied population is homogenous in access to
education or examination. We thus control for father’s Booi Aha status and apply
subgroup analysis for this reason.
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